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BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA, ET AL.,
Petitioners
V.
Patricia GARRETT, et al., Respondents
No. 99-1240
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided Febraury 21, 2001
Court Expands State Sovereign Immunity- Again
Trial
Tuesday, May 1, 2001
Erwin Chemerinsky
Without a doubt, one of the most
dramatic changes in constitutional law in
recent years has been the Supreme Court's
substantial expansion of state sovereign
immunity. The Court's recent ruling in
Board of Trustees v. Garrett held that
state governments may not be sued for
employment discrimination in violation of
Title I of the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA).'
This is the latest in a series of decisions in
which the Court has invoked the Eleventh
Amendment, which prohibits bringing
lawsuits against the states in federal court.
In 1999, the Court ruled that state
governments may not be sued for patent
infringement.2 In 2000, the Court held
that state governments may not be sued
for violating the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA).' Also in 1999,
the Court held that sovereign immunity
barred suits against state governments in
state courts, holding that states can't be
sued there for violations of the
federal Fair Labor Standards Act.'
These rulings have established that state
governments cannot be sued without their
consent and that Congress's power to
authorize suits is limited. Each of these
cases was decided by a 5-4 margin, with
the majority comprising Chief Justice
William Rehnquist and Justices Sandra
Day O'Connor, Antonin Scalia, Anthony
Kennedy, and Clarence Thomas. The
dissenters were Justices John Paul Stevens,
David Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and
Stephen Breyer.
In each case, the Court followed the same
analytical approach. However, Garrett
went further than the prior decisions in
restricting Congress's power to authorize
suits against the states: It barred
litigation despite a voluminous record
before Congress documenting
government discrimination against the
disabled. After Garrett, it seems likely that
the Court may deem other litigation under
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important federal civil rights laws to be
precluded by the Eleventh Amendment.
In 1996, in Seminole Tribe v. Florida, the
Court held that Congress may authorize
suits against states only to enforce federal
laws enacted under [sections] 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which empowers
Congress to adopt statutes to enforce that
amendment.' Two decades earlier, in
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, the Court had held
that because the Fourteenth Amendment
came after the Eleventh and was intended
as a limit on state power, Congress may
use its [sections] 5 authority to permit
suits against state governments. But in
Seminole Tribe, the Court ruled that
Congress cannot abrogate sovereign
immunity and permit suits against state
governments to enforce laws enacted
pursuant to its other powers, such as
statutes adopted under the Commerce
Clause.!
The crucial question in determining
whether a state government may be sued
to enforce a federal law is whether that
statute constitutes a valid exercise of
Congress's [sections] 5 power. The
problem is that in the last few years, the
Court has dramatically narrowed the
scope of this power.
In City of Boeme v. Flores, a 1997
decision, the Court held that under
[sections] 5, Congress may not create new
rights or expand the scope of rights.!
Congress may enact laws only to prevent
or remedy violations of rights already
recognized by the Court. These laws must
be narrowly tailored to prevent or remedy
constitutional violations. In the Court's
words, the laws must be "proportionate"
and "congruent" to the problems they
address.
The decision struck down the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 on the
grounds that it impermissibly expanded
the scope of citizens' right to religious
expression and that the statute's
provisions were not shown to be
"proportionate" or "congruent" to
preventing or remedying constitutional
violations.
In 1999, in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Education Expense Board v. College
Savings Bank, the Court invalidated a
federal law authorizing suits against states
for patent infringements because there
were no legislative findings of frequent
infractions by the states.9 Although
patents are unquestionably property
protected from state infringements
by the Due Process Clause, the Court
explained that Congress had not found a
pattern of state violations sufficient to
make the authorization of suits
proportionate" or "congruent" to the
problem.
Likewise, in Kimel v. Florida Board of
Regents, the Court held that state
governments may not be sued for
violating the ADEAo The Court
explained that age discrimination receives
only rational-basis review under equal
protection analysis, so the statute provides
substantially more protection than the
Constitution does. Under rational-basis
review, a law is upheld as long as it is
rationally related to a legitimate
government purpose. The Court said the
ADEA was not an appropriate
preventive or remedial measure because
Congress had not found a pattern
of unconstitutional age discrimination by
state governments.
The new case
Garrett, the Court's latest decision in this
area, follows this analytical framework.
The case involved two claims against
Alabama for violating Title I of the ADA,
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which bars employment discrimination
against the disabled and requires state
employers to make reasonable
accommodations for people with
disabilities."
Patricia Garrett, a registered nurse, sued
the state after she was required to give up
her position as director of nursing at the
University of Alabama in Birmingham
Hospital. Garrett had taken a leave from
work after she was diagnosed with breast
cancer and underwent a lumpectomy,
radiation treatment, and chemotherapy.
The other plaintiff, Milton Ash--a security
officer for the Alabama Department of
Youth Services--sued to challenge lower
performance ratings that he alleged had
resulted from his seeking a change in his
working conditions because of his asthma
and sleep apnea.
The Court, in a 5-4 decision, held that
these claims were barred by the Eleventh
Amendment. Rehnquist, writing for the
Court, followed the now-familiar two-step
analysis used in Florida Prepaid and
KimeL
First, the Court said that Title I of the
ADA expanded rights beyond those
recognized by the Supreme Court under
the Constitution. Rehnquist stated that
disability discrimination receives only
rational-basis review under the Equal
Protection Cause. 2 The Court, citing its
prior ruling in Gebume v. Clebume
Living Center, 3  concluded that
discrimination against the disabled "incurs
only the minimum 'rational-basis' review
applicable to general social and economic
legislation.""
In particular, the Court concluded that the
ADA's reasonable-accommodation
requirement confers substantially greater
rights than those afforded by the
Constitution in prohibiting disability
discrimination. Rehnquist explained:
[The result of Cleburne is that states are
not required by the Fourteenth
Amendment to make special
accommodations for the disabled, so long
as their actions towards such individuals
are rational. They could quite hard-
headedly--and perhaps hard-heartedly--
hold to job-qualification requirements
which do not make allowance for the
disabled."
In the second step of the analysis, the
Court considered whether Title I's
expansion of rights was a valid exercise of
Congress's [sections] 5 powers. It would
be valid only if the statute was deemed a
"proportionate" and "congruent" measure
to prevent and remedy constitutional
violations.
The ADA is arguably different from the
statutes involved in Florida Prepaid and
Kimel because there was an extensive
legislative history documenting state
discrimination against the disabled. Breyer
attached a lengthy appendix to his
dissenting opinion, which listed hundreds
of examples."
The majority, however, found the record
of state discrimination to be insufficient.
Rehnquist explained that "the great
majority of these incidents do not deal
with the activities of the states."' 7 The
Court said that many examples in the
legislative record involved discrimination
by local governments, which are not
protected by sovereign immunity. Also,
the Court said, much of the evidence was
merely anecdotal, and many of the
examples did not involve employment,
the focus of Title I.
The Court concluded, 'Elven if it were to
be determined that each incident upon
fuller examination showed
unconstitutional action on the part of the
state, these incidents taken together fall
far short of even suggesting the pattern of
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unconstitutional discrimination on which
[sections] 5 legislation must be based.""
In a footnote near the end of the opinion,
Rehnquist emphasized that Title I still
applies to the states.'9 The Court said its
provisions "can be enforced by the United
States in actions for money damages, as
well as by private individuals in actions for
injunctive relief under Ex Parte Young."20
But private suits against state
governments for money damages under
Title I of the ADA are barred by the
Eleventh Amendment.
Implications
The Garrett decision raises an important
question: What other suits against states
to enforce federal civil rights laws are
precluded by sovereign immunity? For
example, the Court in Garrett expressly
said it was not considering whether states
can be sued for violating Title II of
the ADA, which prohibits Skates from
discriminating against the disabled in
providing services.21 The Sixth Circuit, in
an opinion that has since been vacated,
has said that Title II is not a valid
abrogation of state sovereign immunity,
while the inth Circuit has come to the
opposite conclusion.n
There is consensus among the circuits
about whether individuals may sue states
under some federal laws. Several circuits
have ruled that the Equal Pay Act" is a
valid exercise of Congress's [sections] 5
power and abrogates sovereign
immunity. On the other hand, there
appears to be a consensus that the Family
and Medical Leave Act26 cannot be used27
to sue state governments.
An important issue that has not yet been
addressed by the Supreme Court is
whether Congress may use its spending
power to override state sovereign
immunity. May Congress condition the
grant of federal money on a waiver of
immunity?
A few federal appeals courts have
considered this question. The Eighth
Circuit, in a recent en banc decision, held
that the Rehabilitation Acte is a proper
exercise of Congress's spending power
and may be used to sue state
governments.29 Other circuits have ruled
that states may be sued for violating Title
IX,"' which prohibits sex discrimination
by recipients of federal funds."
Any plaintiff attorney seeking to sue a
state government must consider the
enormous obstacle to litigation created by
the Supreme Court's sovereign-immunity
decisions. Unquestionably, Garrett makes
it more difficult to use federal civil rights
laws to sue state governments. What is
uncertain is how far the Court will take its
commitment to sovereign immunity and
which federal laws will be found to be a
valid basis for suits against the states.
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James B. HUNT, Jr. v. Martin CROMARTIE, et al; Alfred Smallwood, et al. v.
Martin Cromartie, et al.
Nos. 99-1864 and 99-1865
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided April 18, 2001
Low Profile of High Court Seen in Redistricting Case
Houston CImnicle
Sunday, April 22, 2001
Linda Greenhouse
New York Times
While clearly an important statement
about race and politics, the Supreme
Court's decision last week to uphold the
legality of a long-disputed North
Carolina congressional district may also
have offered a window into the court's
view of its current place in the political
system in the aftermath of Bush v. Gore.
After eight years of decisions striking
down legislative districts as
unconstitutional racial gerrymanders, the
court changed course and in a 5-4 ruling
on Wednesday upheld district lines for
which race had certainly been a factor,
although not a "predominant" one in the
majority's view.
Was this a chastened court, removing a
heavy hand from the shoulders of state
legislators, stepping back from an
increasingly uncomfortable brink of its
own making?
It is impossible from the outside to
ascribe a motive to Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor, whose 1993 opinion in Shaw
v. Reno first put the court in the
business of scrutinizing newly drawn
black districts at the behest of disaffected
white voters by holding that districts
created with race in mind were
constitutionally suspect.
This time, O'Connor did not write an
opinion to explain why she agreed with
the four more liberal justices that North
Carolina's 12th congressional district
now passed constitutional muster on the
court's fourth review of it in eight years.
Her silence was unusual given her past
eagerness to explain herself in this line of
cases; in a 1996 case, she even wrote a
separate concurring opinion to amplify
her own plurality opinion that struck
down three Texas congressional districts
with black or Hispanic majorities as
racial gerrymanders.
Nonetheless, it is tempting to speculate
that not just O'Connor but the court as a
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whole sought this time to lower the
rhetorical temperature and perhaps even
the court's profile in a case with heavy
political overtones.
The tone of both opinions, Justice
Stephen G. Breyer's for the majority and
the dissenting opinion by Justice
Clarence Thomas, was subdued, in
notable contrast to the trading of barbs
that has been standard fare in this
contentious line of cases.
"Maybe the court really wants to tone
down the rhetoric now," said Pamela
Karlan, an election law specialist at
Stanford University Law School, in an
interview. "They don't want to be the
lightning rod in these political cases, to
hear people saying, 'First they took away
the presidency and now they kick all the
blacks and Latinos out of Congress.' "
And in fact, the differences as the two
sides framed them were more procedural
than substantive, having to do with the
degree of deference the court owed to
the factual determinations of the trial
court that conducted the trial and heard
the evidence about the legislators'
motives in drawing a district that was at
once reliably Democratic and 47 percent
black.
"The court has created a doctrine that is
really messy on the ground," professor
Richard Pildes, a voting rights specialist
at New York University Law School,
said Thursday. "Untangling these mixed
motives is extremely complex."
He said the majority's two-part message
was aimed at the lower federal courts
that will be receiving a flood of cases
from the coming round of redistricting:
that while the Supreme Court "is not
going to blindly defer and turn the
process over to the lower courts," those
courts can have confidence when they
encounter a district in which race has
played some role, they can uphold it
without risking the nearly automatic
reversal that the Supreme Court's earlier
rulings had suggested.
"If the lower courts get the message, the
Supreme Court won't have to get
involved" in every case, Pildes said.
Legal scholars had a range of responses
Thursday to the substance of the
decision, Easley v. Cromartie, and to the
question of whether it foreshadowed a
new dynamic on the court on questions
of race in general.
But nearly all who talked about the
decision were struck by its modulated
quality.
"It backs off from the absolutist line we
thought we were seeing," said professor
Douglas Laycock of the University of
Texas Law School. "It may be only for
redistricting, but it's plainly a change in
tone."
Laycock, along with lawyers in the Texas
Attorney General's Office, filed a
petition with the Supreme Court this
week seeking review of a federal appeals
court's latest ruling barring any
consideration of race in admissions to
the law school.
In an interview, he said that while it was
impossible to predict whether the
justices will take the case or how they
will decide it, he sensed that something
in the air had changed on the question of
affirmative action.
"When the Republican Party is visibly
engaging in affirmative action on
national television, that just makes it
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hanier to maintain an absolutist line," he
said.
On affirmative action, as in the
redistricting cases, Justice O'Connor's
role is all-important, serving to
emphasize the fragile nature of any
balance the court manages to achieve.
O'Connor has hired law clerks for the
court term that begins in October 2002,
but umors that she is contemplating
retirement have not faded since the
election.
"There is a very fine line between what is
permissible and what is not," said
professor Samuel Isacharoff of
Columbia Law School, "and it comes
down to what does Justice O'Connor
think is all right."
Despite her silence in this week's
decision, Isacharoff said, the majority
opinion "really just confirms what
O'Connor has been saying all along, that
politics can't be based on a racial spoils
system, that you need somehow to mute
the racial dynamics of it."
Copyright 0 2001 The New York Tims
Company
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Last Term:
James ALEXANDER, et al., Petitioners
V.
Martha SANDOVAL
No. 99-1908
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided April 24, 2001
Civil Rights Ruling Could Affect Education Bias Cases
Education Week
Wednesday, May 2, 2001
Mark Walsh
The U.S. Supreme Court last week
substantially curtailed a key federal civil
rights law, ruling that there is no private
right to sue over so-called disparate-
impact discrimination in programs
receiving federal money.
The 5-4 decision could have a significant
effect in education because civil rights
plaintiffs have been suing for years over
alleged discriminatory effects in a variety
of educational programs, such as testing
and school finance.
Title VI of the Gvil Rights Act of 1964
bars intentional discrimination based on
race, color, or national origin in federally
financed programs. But regulations
adopted by many federal agencies,
including the Department of Education,
extend the law's prohibition to action that
merely has a discriminatory impact on
protected groups.
Lower federal courts have long assumed
there was a private right to sue under the
disparate-- impact regulations adopted by
agencies under the Civil Rights Act.
But now the Supreme Court has said that
the Title VI regulations cannot be
enforced through private lawsuits because
Congress never explicitly authorized such
suits when it passed or amended the Civil
Rights Act.
"It is most certainly incorrect to say that
language in a regulation can conjure up a
private cause of action that has not
been authorized by Congress," Justice
Antonin Scalia wrote for the majority in
Alexander v. Sandoval (Case No. 99-
1908). "Agencies may play the sorcerer's
apprentice but not the sorcerer himself."
He was joined by Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist and Justices Sandra Day
O'Connor, Anthony M. Kennedy, and
Carence Thomas.
Justice John Paul Stevens, in a dissent
joined by Justices David H. Souter, Ruth
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Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer,
noted that "every Court of Appeals to
address the question had concluded that a
private right of action exists" to enforce
Title VI regulations against nonintentional
discrimination. "And Congress had
adopted several statutes that appear to
ratify the status quo," Justice Stevens
wrote.
Education Cases
The case was a challenge by a Mexican
immigrant, Martha Sandoval, to Alabama's
policy of requiring that its driver's test be
administered only in English. Neither
opinion had much to say about the
underlying issue of "official English"
policies because the Supreme Court
appeal was focused on the question of
private lawsuits under Title VI.
Legal experts said the impact of the
court's ruling would be felt well beyond
the Alabama Department of Motor
Vehicles.
"This opinion eviscerates the Civil Rights
Act of 1964," argued Thomas K. Gilhool,
a lawyer with the Public Interest Law
Center of Philadelphia. The private legal
organization is helping represent the
Philadelphia school district and a class of
low-income families in a novel federal
lawsuit challenging Pennsylvania's school
funding system.
The lawsuit cited the federal Department
of Education's Title VI rules against
disparate-impact bias as the basis for a
claim that the state illegally discriminates
against districts with large numbers of
minority students.
After a federal district judge dismissed the
suit, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd
Circuit, in Philadelphia, reinstated it in
1999 and ruled there was a private right to
sue over the alleged disparate-impact
discrimination.
Several other prominent lawsuits
education have relied in part on a Tide
disparate-impact claim, including:
in
VI
* A school finance lawsuit pitting New
York City minority families against the
state. Although that lawsuit is in state
court, a state judge in January allowed the
lawsuit to proceed based in part on a
Tide VI disparate-impact claim.
* A lawsuit challenging the Texas high
school graduation test was allowed to
proceed in federal district court in San
Antonio last year on the theory that the
test had a discriminatory effect on
minority students.
* A federal lawsuit challenging the
University of California's use of the SAT
in college admissions is based on Title VI
disparate-impact bias, among other claims.
Mr. Gilhool said the Philadelphia case was
not doomed by the Supreme Court's
ruling because the case also makes claims
of intentional discrimination under the
1964 Civil Rights Act and an older federal
civil rights law.
But he and other civil rights activists
acknowledge that it is much more difficult
to prove there is intentional
discrimination in a program receiving
federal money. Furthermore, while there
is no longer a private right to sue over
discriminatory effects, federal agencies can
still use their enforcement powers against
that type of bias by withholding federal
aid, for example. But federal agencies have
limited resources, and private lawsuits
have traditionally been viewed as a way to
extend the protections of a civil rights law.
John H. Findley, a lawyer with the Pacific
Legal Foundation in Sacramento, Calif.,
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hailed the court's ruling, saying that
Congress never intended to allow lawsuits
over discriminatory effects.
Sexual Harassment
Separately last week, the justices
unanimously threw out a sexual-
harassment suit filed by an administrator
against the Clark County, Nev., school
district.
Shirley A. Breeden, a human resources
administrator in the 231,000-student
district, which includes Las Vegas, alleged
that she had suffered retaliation for
complaining about a brief incident with
co-workers that she considered to be
sexual harassment. At a 1994 meeting, two
male coworkers laughed about a job
applicant's comment to a another worker
that "making love to you is like making
love to the Grand Canyon." The
statement was disclosed in a psychological
report.
Ms. Breeders alleged the district moved
her from the central office to a remote
location and changed some of her job
duties in retaliation for her complaints.
In an unsigned opinion in Clark County
School District v. Breeders (No. 00-866),
the court ruled her allegations did not
amount to a violation of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, which covers
job discrimination.
The single incident "cannot remotely be
considered extremely serious, as our cases
require," the court's opinion said.
Copyright © 2001 Bell & Howell
Information and Learning Company. All
rights reserved. Copyright 0 2001
Editorial Projects in Education, Inc.
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PGA TOUR, INC., Petitioner
V.
Casey MARTIN
No. 00-24
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided May29, 2001
Martin Allowed to Ride on Tour
Reaction Mixed on cowt Ruling
The Fort Worth Star-Telegram
Wednesday, May 30, 2001
Johnny Paul
The Supreme Court's ruling in PGA
Tour vs. Martin hit closer to home than
the golf course or office for Brian
Shannon.
The Texas Tech law professor filed a brief
on Casey Martin's behalf for the Supreme
Court, but Tuesdays landmark decision
tugged at the heart of a father who desires
a better world for his child. Shannon's 9-
year-old daughter, Julia, also suffers from
the rare circulatory disease that afflicts
Martin.
"It's very important symbolically because
people with a disability get a chance for a
full life," Shannon said. "It demonstrates
to someone like Julia that there are no
limits."
The Supreme Court determined that Title
II of the Americans with Disabilities Act
can be applied to athletics, and that
governing bodies must waive rules of play
to accommodate disabled athletes, by
awarding Martin the right to ride in a golf
cart during PGA Tour events.
The ADA bans discrimination against the
disabled in public accommodations and
requires "reasonable modifications" unless
the modifications fundamentally alter the
place or event. The PGA Tour views
walking the golf course throughout an
event as a fundamental aspect of its sport.
"I think this opens some doors for
people," said Martin, who suffers from
Klippel-Trenaunay-Weber syndrome,
which prevents blood from circulating
properly through his withered right leg.
The Justices' opinion, though, created a
very narrow passage, according to PGA
Tour commissioner Tim Finchem.
"They have done two things that we think
are most important," he said. "One, the
court is clearly focused in its decision on
Casey Martin and Casey Martin only. A
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number of times in the opinion, they
make it quite clear that they are not
certain at all that this same decision would
apply to any other competitor with respect
to walking under the rules of the PGA
Tour. In fact, they go so far to say that
Casey Martin may be the only individual
in the world that has the combination of
the talent necessary to play on the PGA
Tour and a disability which precludes him
from walking the golf course and playing
the game.
"As a consequence, the court goes further
to suggest that they do not think that the
Act ... necessarily should apply to players
who have difficulty walking the golf
course or who suffer discomfort from
walking the golf course. As a
consequence, I think we can reasonably
assume from this initial reading of the
opinion that we now have the flexibility to
maintain our rules as they relate to
walking."
Some tour pros questioned
organization's interpretation.
their
"I would like to know to how they ruled
on their decision in favor of Casey," Stuart
Appleby said. "Did they specifically rule
for him or does it leave the door open for
a lot more issues to cover? Now, there's a
question: What is a disability? Is there a
disability from playing golf for 25 years?
My concern is that they've opened a can
of worms. And how big is that can?"
Said Hal Sutton: "We're in a real gray area
here now. Who's the governing body of
the door they opened?"
Justice John Paul Stevens wrote in the
majority opinion that "allowing Martin to
use a golf cart would not fundamentally
alter the nature of PGA Tour's
tournaments."
Tour pros debated the court's opinion.
"It's the same reason they try to ban drugs
in sports," Frank Nobilo said, "because it
gives an advantage."
Steve Pate echoed Nobilo's opinion.
"Walking six miles a day six days a week is
part of the deal," he said. "If you don't
think we're a sport, then a part of my
premise is gone. But I think we are. In
sports, everybody brings their own
strengths and weaknesses to the game,
and whoever can overcome their
weaknesses and maximize their strengths
is going to do well. It's maybe not fair, but
I just think it's the way it should be."
Paul Azinger took a different stance.
"I don't think this is hurtful to the game,"
he said. "Casey Martin is a unique person,
and his is a unique situation. This is
great for Casey Martin. If anyone else
wants a cart, they are going
to have to pursue the same avenues he
did. They are going to have to go through
the same process. I think anyone who
plays the game empathizes with his
situation and should be happy for him."
Finchen described the court's ruling as
one that "went so far as to suggest in
rather strong language that this could be
the only player in the world that it ever
applies to."
Yet, what if a similar case presents itself?
"I think we'll have a much more specific
statement on that in a couple months time
after we have had a time to totally review
it, review all the case laws, talk directly to
our policy board and probably by the fall,
we'll have a full and complete statement
of how we shall proceed," Finchem said.
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The tour would have preferred to have
found a way to provide an exception for
Iartin without surrendering its view that
walking is a fundamental aspect of the
sport. Yet, no solution existed, the
comnissioner said.
"Hopefully, with the way this opinion is
written, we can have our cake and eat it,
too," Finchem said. "That would be a
great thing if that were to come to pass.
We're hopeful now that can happen."
Copyright a 2001 Forth Worth Star-
Telegram.
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Last Tenm:
CIRCUIT CITY STORES, INC, Petitioner
V.
Saint Clair ADAMS, Respondent
No. 99-1379
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided March 21, 2001
Top Court Backs Employers in Arbitration Dispute
National UnderwriterPropety & Grsualty-Risk &Benefits Management
Monday, April 2, 2001
Steven Brostoff
Employment contracts that require
disputes to be resolved through
arbitration are enforceable except for a
limited class of workers, the U.S.
Supreme Court has ruled.
In a 5-4 decision, the court said the
Federal Arbitration Act-which compels
judicial enforcement of arbitration
agreements but has an exception for
employment contracts involving seamen,
railroad employees and similar workers--
must be interpreted narrowly.
The exception, the court said, is confined
only to transportation workers. The 9th
Circuit Court of Appeals in San Francisco
erred in interpreting the exception to
apply to all employment contracts, the
high court ruled.
The issue in the case--Circuit City v.
Adams--involves an employment
discrimination charge brought against the
Richmond, Va.-based Circuit City Stores,
Inc.
The employee filed a complaint against
Circuit City under California's
employment discrimination act. Circuit
City sued in federal court to prevent the
state-court action and enforce an
employment contract provision requirng
all disputes to be settled by arbitration.
The 9th Circuit said that even though the
Federal Arbitration Act limits the
exception to employment contracts
involving seamen, railroad employees and
other classes of workers engaged in
foreign or interstate commerce, this
should be read as encompassing the
"outer limits" of interstate commerce, and
thus apply to all employment contracts.
But using certain principles of statutory
construction, the U.S. Supreme Court
said the better reading of the exception is
that it only applies to employment
contracts of transportation workers.
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Last Tenn:
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, Petitioner
V.
Enrico ST. CYR, Respondent
No. 00-767
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided June 25, 2001
Legal Reprieve Buoys Immigrants
Court Ruling Stays Many Deportations
The Boston Globe
Wednesday; June 27, 2001
CindyRodn'guez
Thousands of immigrants in
Massachusetts and hundreds of
thousands more across the nation who
were on the verge of being expelled from
the United States for pleading guilty to
felonies won a reprieve Monday when
the US Supreme Court ruled that
Immigration Court cannot automatically
deport them.
The ruling unraveled a federal law that
took effect in 1996 that immigration
lawyers refer to as "one strike, you're out."
It mandated that criminals convicted of
certain felonies, and even some
misdemeanors - redefined by Congress as
"aggravated felonies" - be deported
without a court hearing.
Immigration lawyers yesterday applauded
the highest court's 5-to-4 decision, some
with outright glee.
"Whooo-ho! This is great news," said
Anthony Drago, a Boston immigration
lawyer. "For four years now we've been
fighting this at the federal level. We're at
least back to the point where these
people can be judged."
Under the Supreme Court decision, those
who would have been subject to
automatic deportation now will be able to
apply for relief, meaning judges could take
work and family history into consideration
when determining if someone should be
deported.
The ruling applies only to people who
plead guilty. Many immigrants would have
pleaded not guilty had they known this
1996 law - which is retmoactive - meant
mandatory explusion.
For Maria Ruth, a Colombian immigrant
who used to live in northern
137
Massachusetts and now lives in the
Washington, D.C, area, the ruling is a
relief. She's confident that a judge will side
with her once her case and her life history
are examined.
"They told me that if I pleaded guilty I
wouldn't be deported," said Ruth, 40, who
in 1992 pleaded guilty to conspiracy to sell
drugs.
She spent nearly a year in prison, but, after
the 1996 law was enacted, Immigration
and Naturalization Service agents came to
her house and told her she would be
deported for the 1992 felony conviction.
"There are a lot of people who have this
problem that I have and they are not
guilty and they had to plead guilty," Ruth
said.
Jim Dragon, her current lawyer, can attest
to that. His Lowell firm has about 120
clients who are in Ruth's position. Many
are being held in prison because one of
the mandates of the 1996 law is that
iunmigrants awaiting deportation remain in
prison as INS detainees. In 2000, there
were an estimated 18,500 INS detainees
being held in prisons, according to the
INS.
"There's a lot of people who gave up and
said, 'Mr. Dragon, I don't want to stay in
prison,' and gave up and went back to
their homeland."
But for some immigrants, such as Cubans
and Iraqis, the United States will not send
them home, so they remain in prison
instead. The American Immigration
Lawyers Association compiled a list of
4,000 immigrants in prison that they call
"lifers."
Dragon said the Supreme Court decision,
INS v. St. Cyr, represents a "step in the
right direction and attempts to correct the
mean-spirited immigration laws that
followed the bombings of federal and
private buildings which all were at first
thought to have been committed by alien
terrorists."
While those who have languished in
deportation limbo can now have their day
in front of an Immigration Court judge,
Dragon said he wonders what'll become
of those who gave up their fight and
returned to their native countries.
"These people must be allowed to enter
the United States and pursue their rights
under St. Cyr," he said.
Copyright 0 2001 The Boston Globe
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Last Tenm:
Kestutis ZADVYDAS, Petitioner
V.
Christine G. DAVIS and Immigration and Naturalization Services, John Ashcroft,
Attorney General, et al., Petitioners
V.
Kim Ho Ma
Nos. 99-7791 and 00-38
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided June 28, 2001
Court Limits Detention of Inunigrants:
Justices Rule Convicts Can't be Held Indefinitely
The Washington Post
Friday, June 29, 2001
Charles Lane and Hanna Rosin
The Supreme Court ruled yesterday that
immigrants who have committed crimes
in the United States cannot be detained
indefinitely, even if there is no other
country to which they can be deported.
By a 5 to 4 vote, the court rejected the
Immigration and Nationalization Service's
policy of holding such immigrants as long
as it deems necessary to protect public
safety. Under the policy, the immigrants
can win release only by proving they pose
no danger to the community.
The ruling represents the high court's
second rebuff to U.S. immigration policy
this week. On Monday, the court, again
splitting 5 to 4, said federal law does not
permit the INS to automatically deport
illegal immigrants convicted of even
minor crimes.
Some predicted the cases, taken together,
could have broad implications for how
immigration law is applied, forcing
Congress to apply the same constitutional
principles to immigrants that are granted
to U.S. citizens.
"This could be a sea change in
immigration law," said Georgetown
University law professor Alex Aleinikoff,
a former INS general counsel. "For the
last 100 years, the court has said Congress
has full power in immigration law. This
decision implies that . . . we apply the
same standard to immigrants as to U.S.
citizens."
Supporters of the government's position
said the court was engaged in an act of
judicial legislation, usurping Congress's
long-established authority to set
immigration law.
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"In this one, the court greatly expanded
the . . . rights of aliens, saying they have
the same ones as citizens," said Richard
Samp of the Washington Legal
Foundation. "It's kind of a slap in the face
of Congress."
The dispute grows out of a 1996 change
in the immigration law reflecting
Congress's diminishing patience for
immigrants. Previously, immigrants who
had committed crimes would be released
into parole after six months until an
agreement with their countries was
reached. Under the new law, nothing
blocked the INS from holding them
indefinitely.
In yesterday's decision, the court said that
could violate the immigrants' due process
rights. "The serious constitutional
problem arising out of a statute that, in
these circumstances, permits an indefinite,
perhaps permanent, deprivation of human
liberty without any . . . protection is
obvious," Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote
in his opinion for the court.
Once immigrants enter the country they
are entitled to constitutional protections
"whether their presence here is lawful,
unlawful, temporary or permanent,"
Breyer said.
He was joined by Justices Sandra Day
O'Connor, John Paul Stevens, David H
Souter and Ruth Bader Ginsburg.
Yesterday's decision will immediately
affect about 2,700 "lifers" -- people who
committed crimes in the United States
and then were ordered deported, but
whose countries have refused to take
them back. They have been held at INS-
run detention centers or local jails.
Their cases are reviewed every six months
by INS officers, who determine whether
they are a threat to the community. Of the
4,000 reviews the INS conducted from
February 1999 to February 2000, about
1,800 resulted in detainees being released,
according to the INS.
Most are legal immigrants who never
applied for citizenship. About half are
from Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Cuba,
countries that refuse to take back expelled
immigrants. For them, the decision means
they will likely be released on parole at
their next six-month hearing.
The court yesterday emphasized that its
ruling had no application to aliens
detained for other reasons, such as those
denied entry and held at bonier locations,
or to potential cases involving suspected
terrorists or other national security risks.
Dissenting in yesterday's case, Justice
Anthony M. Kennedy, joined by Chief
Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices
Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas, said
he did not see how this distinction could
be sustained in practice.
Kennedy argued that the court's ruling
requires federal judges to intervene in
foreign policy decisions about negotiating
repatriation agreements -- and will
effectively give other countries the right to
determine U.S. immigration policy.
Yesterday's ruling involved two men. Kim
Ho Ma is a Cambodian refugee who came
to the United States in 1985 and
participated in an ambush of a fellow gang
member in Seattle 10 years later. He
served 38 months for first-degree
manslaughter and was ordered deported.
But Cambodia has no repatriation
agreement with the United States.
Last year, the San Francisco-based 9th
Circuit Court of Appeals ordered Ma's
release. It said immigration law does not
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allow INS to hold people more than a
"reasonable time" beyond the 90 days
specified in the law.
That ruling conflicted with the result in
the case of Kestutis Zadvydas. Described
by his lawyers as "a citizen of no country,"
Zadvydas was born to Lithuanian parents
in a refugee camp in U.S.-occupied
Germany in 1948. He came to the United
States in 1956 and spent much of his life
either in jail or as a fugitive. After serving
two years on a cocaine charge, Zadvydas
was ordered deported in 1994.
But neither Germany nor Lithuania would
claim him as a citizen, and Zadvydas spent
four years in various jails before a federal
district judge ordered him released. In
1999, the New Orleans-based 5th Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed that order,
saying that Zadvydas's situation was
legally analogous to that of an illegal
immigrant detained at the border.
In yesterday's ruling, the Supreme Court
defined a set of guidelines that lower
courts should follow in deciding whether
to release an alien: If the alien can show
that there is "good reason" to believe that
his deportation will not be possible within
a reasonable time, and the government
cannot rebut that claim, the court should
order him out of jail and into INS-
supervised probation.
The case was Zadvydas v. Davis, No. 99-
7791, consolidated with Ashcroft
v. Ma, No. 00-38.
Copyright 0 The Washington Pcat
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Last Tenn:
Tuan Ahn NGUYEN
V.
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE,
No. 99-2071
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided June 11, 2001
Parent's Sex May Be Factor in Citizenship, Court Rules
Jusdces UpholdLaw Favoring US. Mothers of Out-of Wedlock Childrn
The Washington Post
Tuesday, June 12, 2001
Charles Lane
The government may make it more
difficult for children born out of
wedlock overseas to U.S. citizen fathers
to claim citizenship than for the children
of American mothers, the Supreme
Court ruled yesterlay, rejecting a claim
that the different treatment violates the
constitutional guarantee of equal
protection.
By a vote of 5 to 4, the court held that,
in adopting different rules depending on
whether the mother or father was a U.S.
citizen, Congress was attempting to
ensure that such children have a clear
biological and social attachment to their
U.S. citizen parent, and therefore was
engaging in a constitutionally acceptable
form of gender discrimination.
Women's rights groups had challenged the
law as one of the few surviving examples
in federal law of what they called gender-
based stereotypes about the parenting
roles of men and women.
But Justice Anthony MvL Kennedy, in the
opinion for the court, wrote, "There is
nothing irrational or improper in the
recognition that at the moment of birth --
a critical event in the statutory scheme and
in the whole tradition of citizenship law --
the mother's knowledge of the child and
the fact of parenthood have been
established in a way not guaranteed in the
case of the unwed father. This is not a
stereotype."
The law in question says children born out
of wedlock abroad to mothers who are
U.S. citizens may become citizens almost
automatically. In the case of children of
U.S. citizen fathers, however, one of
several legal steps must be taken first to
establish paternity -- before the child
reaches the age of 18.
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The case decided yesterday involved Tuan
Ain Nguyen and his father, Joseph
Boulais of Texas. Nguyen was born in
Saigon in 1969 and abandoned by his
Vietnamese mother soon thereafter.
Boulais, who had come to Vietnam with
the U.S. government during the Vietnam
War, took custody of the child and
brought him to the States in 1975 -- but
never acted to establish legal paternity or
have his son naturalized as a citizen.
In 1992, Nguyen pleaded guilty in a Texas
court to two counts of sexual abuse of a
minor, and was sentenced to 16 years in
prison. Three years later, the Immigration
and Naturalization Service moved to
deport him to Vietnam, his country of
citizenship, as an alien who had
committed felonies involving moral
turpitude.
While that matter was tied up in the
immigration bureaucracy, Boulais
obtained a court order declaring him
Nguyen's father based on a DNA test. But
an immigration appeals board rejected
Nguyen's subsequent claim of citizenship,
citing Boulais's failure to act before his
son's 18th birthday.
They appealed to a federal appeals court,
contending that the immigration law
discriminated against them on the basis of
sex. Last year that court, too, sided with
the federal government.
Having wrestled inconclusively with the
same issue in a 1998 case, the Supreme
Court agreed to hear the appeal.
The case presented the unusual situation
that women's rights groups, who strongly
supported the appeal, were going to bat
for two men -- one of them an admitted
sex offender -- claiming sex
discrimination.
The groups did so, they said, to establish
the larger principle that the government
should not legislate based on outmoded
notions of parenting roles. Indeed, the
groups argued, the fact that Nguyen's
mother abandoned him while his father
took responsibility refutes a premise of
the immigration law's gender-based
distinction between men and women.
"We tried to show that a lot of what this is
based on is historic discrimination," said
Nancy Duff Campbell of the National
Women's Law Center, which filed a
friend-of-the-court brief on behalf of
Nguyen and Boulais.
Dissenters agreed, saying that gender-
neutral alternatives to the law could easily
be devised and emphasizing that modem
DNA testing can establish paternity
reliably, even if a father is not present at
the child's birth.
"Indeed, the majority's discussion may
itself simply reflect the stereotype of male
irresponsibility that is no more a basis for
the validity of the classification than are
stereotypes about the traditional behavior
patterns of women," Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor wrote in a dissenting opinion
joined by Justices David H. Souter,
Stephen G. Breyer and Ruth Bader
Ginsburg.
The case is Nguyen v. INS, No. 99-2071.
Copyright * 2001 The Washington Pcst
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00-860 Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko
Ruling Below (2d Cir., 229 F.3d 374, 69 US.L.W. 1212):
Private corporation acting under color of federal law is subject to suit under Biwm v Six Unknoum
NanadAgens fFderalBumau cfNantics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), for violation of federal constitutional
rights.
Question Presented: Should cause of action for damages under Bim be implied against private
corporation acting under color of federal law?
John E. MALESKO, Plaintiff-Appellant
V.
CORRECTIONAL SERVICES CORPORATION, et al, Defendant-Appellees
United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit
Decided October 6, 2000
SOTOMAYOR, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiff-appellant John E. Malesko appeals
from the July 28, 1999 judgement of the
United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York (Martin, Jud)
dismissing his complaint against defendant-
appellee Correctional Services Corporation
("CSC') and a specifically named CSC
employee, and denying him leave to file a
second amended complaint. For the reasons
that follow, we vacate the district court's
dismissal of the claims against CSC We
affirm, however, the district court's dismissal
of Malesko's claim against the individual CSC
employee as time-barred and the denial of
leave to file the second amended complaint
on the same ground.
BACKGROUND
On December 3, 1992, following his
conviction for federal securities fraud,
Malesko was sentenced to eighteen months
imprisonment under the supervision of the
federal Bureau of Prisons ("BOP"). While in
the custody and care of BOP, Malesko was
diagnosed with a heart condition, which was
treated with prescription medication. On
February 2, 1994, Malesko was transferred to
Le Marquis Community Corrections Center, a
halfway house where he was to serve out the
balance of his sentence. The halfway house is
operated on behalf of BOP by CSC, a private
corporation.
Malesko was assigned to living quarters on the
fifth floor of the halfway house and was
permitted to use the elevator to travel from
the lobby to his room. On or about march 1,
1994, however, CSC allegedly instituted a
policy requiring inmates residing below the
sixth floor to use only the staircase to travel
from the first-floor lobby to their rooms.
Despite CSCs policy, Malesko claims he was
permitted to use the elevator because the CSC
staff knew of his medical condition.
According to Malesko, however, on March
28, 1994, a CSC employee prevented him
from using the elevator to go from the lobby
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to his room on the fifth floor. The employee
instead directed Malesko to climb the
staircase, even though Malesko reminded the
employee of his heart condition. While
climbing the stairs, Malesko suffered a heart
attack, fell, and injured himself. Malesko also
claims that approximately ten days prior to
this incident, he had run out of the
medication prescribed for his heart condition,
and that CSC had failed to replenish his
medication as of that date.
On March 27, 1997, Malesko filed a pro se
action in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York, claiming
violations of his rights in connection with the
foregoing. Malesko did not name any specific
individuals as defendants, instead, he named
ten "unknown" "DOE" defendants.
On February 2, 1999, Malesko, by counsel,
filed an Amended Complaint, which was
identical to the initial complaint in all material
respects except that it substituted Jorge Urena
as "JOHN DOE DEFENDANT # 1" and
alleged that Urena was the CSC employee
who prevented Malesko's use of the elevator
on March 28, 1994 and directed Malesko to
climb the stairs.' On February 10, 1999, CSC
moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint.
On February 17, 1999, Malesko cross-moved
seeking to file a second amended complaint to
name as "DOE" defendants additional CSC
employees allegedly responsible for Malesko's
injuries.
On July 28, 1999, the district court entered a
judgement granting CSCs motion to dismiss
the Amended Complaint, denying Malesko's
motion to file a second amended complaint,
dismissing the Amended Complaint as against
Defendants-Appellees do not dispute that the CSC
employee in question was Jorge Urena.
Urena and instructing the Clerk of Court to
close the case. See Maksko v Conalional Sers.
COp., 1999 US. Dist LEXIS 11403, Na97
Civ 4080 (JSM), 1999 Wn 549003 (S.D.N.Y.
July 28, 1999). The district court treated
Malesko's Amended Complaint as raising
claims under Bium v Sir Unknoum Nanrd
A gras c Federal Burau j Namuotis, 403 US.
388, 397, 29 L.Ed 2d 619, 91 S. Ca 1999
(1971), which provides for a cause of action
against federal agents who violate
constitutional rights.
The district court dismissed the Amended
Complaint as to CSC on two grounds. First, it
held that Malesko could not bring a Biwr
claim against a corporation such as CSC
because, according to the district court, "[a]
BiIea action may only be maintained against
an individual." Id 1999 US. Dist LEXIS
11403, at *3, Id at *1. Second, the district
court held that, even if Malesko could assert a
Bium claim against a private corporation, CSC
was nevertheless "shielded from liability"
because CSC had "contracted with the federal
government to carry out a project on behalf
of the government." Id
The district court also denied Malesko's
motion to file a second amended complaint
naming additional specific CSC employees as
defendants. The district court found that
because the statute of limitations had run on
Malesko's BiTem claims as of March 28, 1997
(one day after he filed his initial complaint),
Malesko's subsequent assertion of such claims
against additional defendants was time-barred
and therefore a "futile amendment" under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15. See id 1999 US. Dist
LEXIS 11403, at *4, Id at *2. The district
court rejected Malesko's contention that his
substitution of specifically named defendants
should "relate back" to the filing date of his
initial complaint. See id 1999 US. Dist
LEXIS 11403, at *4, Id at *2-*3.
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The district court dismissed the Amended
Complaint as to Urena on similar grounds,
finding that the Amended Complaint
substituting Urena as a defendant had been
filed nearly two years after the statute of
limitations had run. Sw id 1999 U.S. Dist
LEXIS 11403, at '*4, Id at *3. This appeal
followed.
DISCUSSION
I. Gains A gairt CSC
Because the district court dismissed Malesko's
claims against CSC on the pleadings, we
review that decision de nom accepting as true
all material factual allegations in the
complaint. See Jam v New Yok Div Of
Military ard Naud Affain, 166 F.3d 45, 48 (2d
Cir. 1999).
A. BiM Clairm and Piute Corporatior
We note initially that the question of whether
a Bizw claim may lie against a private
corporation is an issue of first impression in
this Circuit. The district court dismissed
Malesko's Bims claim against CSC because it
concluded that a Bi= claim may only be
asserted against an individual federal agent,
not against private corporations such as CSC.
The district court reached this result through
a purported application of the Supreme
court's decision in FDIC v Meyer, 510 US.
471, 127 L.Ed 2d 308, 114 S. Ct 996 (1994),
which held that Bimes claims may not be
brought against agencies of the federal
government. The district court did not explain
why Mej's holding regarding federal agencies
precluded a Bim claim against CSQ which is
not a federal agency. Reviewing this question
de n=4 we now hold that a private
corporation acting under color of federal law
may be subject to a Biwm- claim.
Although the issue is new in this circuit,
several circuit courts recognized prior to the
Me)er decision that Bimr-type claims could be
asserted against private corporations so long
as the corporations engaged in "federal
action", Le, they acted under color of federal
law. See, eg, Saboxengmi v Genral Dmniz
Corp., 823 F.2d 1328 (9 cir 1987) (holding that
private corporation employed by Department
of navy to provide security services would be
subject to Bizms claims, if, on remand, its
actions were found to constitute federal
action); Genna v Puerto Rico Legl Seru, Inc,
697 F.2d 447 (1" Cir. 1983) (recognizing that
private entities may be subject to Bims claims,
but dismissing claims at issue against legal
assistance corporation because it did not
engage in federal action); Ddbyr v E-Syterrs,
Inc, 667 F.2d 1219 (5 Cir. 1982) (permitting
Biwm claim against private contractor that
supplied personnel, materials, transportation
and services to federal government);
Yianzytmis u ClYenical Abtras Seru, 521
F.2d 1392 (6h Cir. 1975) (per curiam)
(remanding for factual determination of
whether private corporation engaged in
federal action for purposes of Biws). During
this pre-Mewr time period, no circuit court
ever held that private entities were not subject
to BiTM claims.
In 1994, the Supreme Court addressed in
Meyer whether "to expand the category of
defendants against whom Biwm type actions
may be brought to include not only federal
agents, but federal agencies as well." 510 U.S.
at 484. Me)er involved a Bimm claim against
the Federal Saving and Loan Insurance
Corporation based on an alleged violation of
an individual's due process rights. See id At
484-85. The Court, noting that no Court of
Appeals decision other than the decision on
appeal had ever implied a Bium cause of
action directly against a federal agency,
declined to do so for several reasons. First,
part of the rationale for creating the Bims
cause of action against federal officials had
been to compensate for the fact that "a direct
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cause of action was not available." Id At 485.
Second, allowing Bize suits against agencies
would contravene "the purpose of Biwns
[which] is to deter the officer." Id The
supreme Court explained that, because a
plaintiff bringing a Bizes claim against an
agency could thereby avoid facing the
qualified immunity defense available to
officers, "there would be no reason for
aggrieved parties to bring damages actions
against individual officers" and "the deterrent
effects of the Bir.e remedy would be lost." Id
Finally, the Court, observing that "a direct
action for damages against the federal
agencies...would be creating a potentially
enormous financial burden for the Federal
Government," refused to expand the
government's direct liability without
congressional legislation to that effect. Id at
486.
Although Megr addressed only whether Bir
claims could be brought against federal
agencies and thus, on its face, did not appear
to implicate the question of whether a private
corporation could be sued under the Bizm,
other circuits have reached differing
conclusions regarding its impact on such
claims. In the D.C Circuit, the Court of
appeals has held that Meyr precludes BiwErs
suits against private entities acting under color
of federal law, thereby overturning an earlier
pre-Me)er D.C. Circuit decision allowing such
claims. See Ka ffnmn v A n#-A nrican Sdxd f
Sqa, 307 U.S. App. D.C 356, 28 F.3d 1223
(D.C Cir 1994), ocemdingRuder v Umi States,
242 US. App. D.C 370, 750 F.2d 1039 (D.C
Cir. 1985).2 Declaring in Kauffmn that its
decision was "controlled by FDIC v Mep,"
the D.C Circuit, over a vigorous dissent by
2 In Reder, the D.C. Circuit had held that Bras
encompassed actions against private parties acting
under color of federal law, and had remanded the case
for a determination of whether the defendant, an
operator of a government-owned facility pursuant to a
contract with the National Cancer Institute, had so
acted. Id
then-Chief Judge Mikva, held that Bizen
claims could not be asserted against the
Anglo-American School of Sofia, a "private
and independent organisation" established by
the U.S. Department of State "to provide
elementary-level instruction to the children of
American and British diplomats stationed in
Sofia, Bulgaria." 28 F.3d at 1224 (internal
quotation marks omitted). The Ka4ffn
majority reasoned that because a private entity
must act under color of federal law in order to
be subject to Biws, such an entity is
"equivalent" to a federal agency and, under
Meer, must be treated as "if [it] were really a
federal agency." Id at 1227.
The Kaifmn majority, echoing Meyr's
rationale that the deterrence purpose of Biwes
would be frustrated if claims could be asserted
against federal agencies, found that employees
of private entities would be undeterred from
engaging in unconstitutional conduct if claims
could be asserted against their employers.
The court similarly adopted Mer's reasoning
that Biwm claims against federal agencies
would create a 'potentially large financial drain
on the government" and concluded that the
"diversion of resources from a private entity
created to advance federal interests has effects
similar to those of diversion of resources
directly from the [federal] Treasury" because
such costs would be passed on the
government. The Kauffimn majority thus held
that Me)r's reasoning precluded BieM claims
against private entities acting under color of
federal law.
In contrast, the Sixth Circuit in Hannm v
Nordk Soutin Corp., 156 F.3d 701 (6 Cir.
1998), concluded that "nothing in Meyfr
prohibits a Bi=r claim against a private
corporation that engages in federal action,"
and held that such claims should be allowed.
The Harmns court observed that while Meyr
had focused on Biens deterrence rationale in
concluding that claims should not be asserted
against federal agencies, "the primary goal of
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Bies was to provide a remedy for victims of
constitutional violations by federal agents
where no other remedy exists, regardless of
whether the official would be deterred in the
future from engaging in such conduct."
(citing Bize, 403 US. at 407-08 (Harlan, J.,
concurring)). The court therefore concluded
that "the importance of remedying
constitutional violations" favored the
allowance of Biem claims against private
entities acting under color of federal law
regardless of whether such allowance deterred
future violations. The Hannm court also
found, in contrast to the D.C Circuit, that
Meyr's concern about "the potentially
enormous financial burden on the
Government" was inapplicable with respect to
private corporations because claims against
private corporations do not directly impact
the "federal purse" unless "do not implicate
federal fiscal policy."
Having determined that "Meyer [was] not
dispositive" on the matter, the Sixth Circuit
proceeded to address whether private
corporations should be subject to Bize
claims. The court observed the BizeM claims
against federal officers have consistently been
treated in the same manner as claims against a
officers under 42 U.S.C Section 1983 (1994).
("The standards of liability in Bim actions
are similar to the standards under section
1983. Both the Supreme Court and this court
have noted actions brought under section
1983 was identical consensus was raised in
BiTm actions." (Citing Butz v Ewnomu4 438
US. 478, 500, 57 L.Ed 2d 895, 98 S.(Q 2894
(1978))). The court further noted that "it is
undisputed that corporations engaging in state
action can be sued under section 1983." Id
(Citations omitted). Accordingly, the
Hanmcrs court held the corporations
engaging in federal action should, by analogy,
be subject to Bitem claims. So id 403 U.S. at
708. In so holding, the court observed that it
joined the Court of Appeals for the First,
Fifth and Ninth Circuits. In their conclusions
(albeit pre-Mee) that a BiTes claim may be
brought against private corporations engaging
in federal action. S&- id
We find the Sixth Circuit analysis in Harnm
persuasive and, substantially for the reasons
articulated by that court, we hold that a
private corporation acting under color of
federal law may be sued under Bize. As an
initial matter, we do not believe that Mer is
dispositive here because private entities acting
on behalf of the federal government are not
the equivalent of federal agencies. In Cbn v
Enpim Blue Cnss, 176 F.3d 35 (2d Cir. 1999),
we found that Empire Blue Cross, acting as a
fiscal intermediary on behalf of the
government to process Medicare claims, was
akin to an agent of the government and not a
federal agency. Sw id at 42 ("[defendant] is a
private not-for-profit corporation established
under the laws of the state of New York. It is
not funded by the United States, and the
United States has no proprietary interest in its
operations... [it] may act as an agent for the
government, [by] it is not an institutional arm
of the government such as a department,
commission, board, or bureau."). We see no
reason to treat differently other private
corporations acting on behalf of the
government.
Moreover, the reasons the Supreme Court
articulated in Meer for declining to extend
liability to federal agencies are not compelling
with respect to the question of whether
private corporations should be subject to
Bie liability. Although deterring
wrongdoing by individuals is an important
goal of Bivens liability, we find an extension
of such liability to be warranted even absent a
substantial deterrence defect in order to
accomplish the more important Biwr goal of
providing a remedy for constitutional
violations. Justice Harlan, and this concurring
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opinion in BiW, elaborated upon the
relationship between these two goals:
I agree with the court that the appropriateness
of according Biws compensatory relief does
not turn simply on the deterrent effect liability
will have on federal official conduct.
Damages as a traditional form of
compensation for invasion of a legally
protected interest may be entirely appropriate
even if no substantial deterrent effects on
future official lawlessness might be brought to
result. Biwns, after all, has invoked judicial
processes claiming entitlement to
compensation for injuries resulting from
allegedly lawless official behavior, if those
injuries are properly compensable in money
damages. I do not think a court of law-vested
with the power to accord a remedy-should
deny him his relief simply because he cannot
show that future lawless conduct will thereby
be deterred.
Bizwm, 403 U.S. at 407-08 (Harlan, J.,
concurring). In any event, we are not
convinced that allowing Bi= claims against
private corporations would undermine the
deterrence purpose of bivens. Even assuming
a plaintiff would decline to sue the offending
employee and sue only the employer, we
believe that an employer facing exposure to
such liability would be motivated to prevent
unlawful acts by its employees. Furthermore,
although a private entity contracting to carry
out governmental functions might pass on the
costs of Bivens liability to the government, we
do not believe such liability has the type of
direct impact on federal fiscal policy that the
Supreme Court in Mejer was concerned would
result from imposing Biwm liability directly
upon federal agencies.'
In our view, the non-unamimous KuIffn decision
finding such impact is incorrect, or, at best, resulted
from the fact the entity at issue was arguably a federal
government agency. Although the Kgm n majority
referred to the defendant school as a "private" entity,
Finally, as noted above, several Courts of
Appeals before Mey's issuance recognized
that private corporations may be subject to
Biem claims. We are not persuaded that the
Supreme Court implicitly overruled this long
line of cases in the Meer opinion without
making reference to any of them. We
therefore find that Mejer does not control our
analysis of whether Bivens claims may be
brought against private corporations.
In deciding that Bivens liability should extend
to private corporations, we are invalid
strongly by the law governing section 1983
claims. We have consistently treated BiTM
and section 1983 actions as analogous for
most purposes, and we "have typically
incorporated section 1983 law into Biwa
actions." Tawz v Rer and 54 F.3d 109, 110
(2d Cir. 1995) (er aman (tngg Cadson v
Gin, 446 U.S. 14, 18 - 20, 64 L. Ed 2d 15,
100 S. Ct 1468 (1980)); se aso A=ni v
Mcda, 35 F. 3d 680, 688 n10 (2"' Cir. 1994);
Ellis v Bhm; 643 F.2d 68, 80 louer (2"' sa
1981). The Supreme Court has made it clear
that private corporations engaging in state
action may be sued under section 1983. See
Lugzr v Edazmdon Oi Co, the 57 US. 922,
936 - 37, 73 L.ed 2 482, 102 S.C 2744
(1982). We see no reason not to incorporate
that law into the BiTm context and permit
suits against private corporations engaging in
federal action. Moreover, we find the
extending Biemn liability to reach private
corporations furthers BiZms overriding
purpose: providing redress for violations of
constitutional rights.
Accordingly, we join the Court of Appeals for
the First, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits and
the school had been set up by the U.S. Department of
State, part of its governing board was appointed by a
U.S. ambassador, and it was directly funded, in part, by
the U.S. government. SeKa'jimn, 28 F.3dat 1224.
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hold that a private corporation may be subject
to liability under Bizms.
B. Government Contractor Defense
In addition to finding that a Bi= action
could not be maintained against C(:C the
district court held that CSC would have been
immune from such a suit in any event by
virtue of the immunity for government
contractors set forth in Bole u United
Tandoi , Op., 487 US. 500, 101 L.Ed 2d
442, 108 S. C1 2510 (1988). (citations omitted)
We disagree, and hold that on the record
presented to the district court, CSC may not
avail itself of a government contractor
defense.
In Boa the Supreme Court articulated the
standard for determining when federal law
shields government contractors from state
tort liability arising from design defects in
military equipment. See BoA 487 US. at 512.
The Supreme Court held:
Liability for design defects in military
equipment cannot be imposed, pursuant to
state law, when (1) the United States approved
reasonably precise specifications; (2) the
equipment conformed to those specifications;
and (3) the supplier warned the United States
about the dangers in the use of the equipment
that were known to the supplier but not to the
United States.
Bo/e 487 US. at 512. ***
Although the government contractor defense
has primarily developed in the context of
military contractors, the defense has been
applied more broadly by some courts to
protect contractors in non-military contexts.
Sa; eg, Bonski v United State, 803 F.2d 1421,
1430 (7b Cir. 1986) (defense applies in
"civilian relationships" where "a contractor
has acted in the sovereign's stead and can
prove the elements of the defense") (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted); Bunus
v Ca'orado Serwn Ca, 772 F.2d 844, 846 (i1'
Gr. 1985) ("Both the history of the defense
and its general rationale lead us to the
conclusion that it would be illogical to limit
the availability of the defense solely to
'military' contractors"). This Circuit has never
expressly addressed the issue.' However, this
case does not present the appropriate forum
in which to do so since, even assuming the
potential applicability of the defense outside
the military context, the requirements
necessary for its application are not satisfied
here.
The government contractor defense only
shields a government contractor from claims
arising out of its actions where the
government exercised its discretion and
judgement in approving precise specifications
to which the contractor must adhere. Se Lezus
v Bahmk Indus., Inc, 985 F.2d 83, 86-87 (2d
Cr. 1993) (holding that government
contractor defense requires "that the design
feature in question was considered by
government officers, and not merely by the
contractor"). In other words, "stripped to its
essentials," the government contractor
defense is "to claim, 'The Government made
me do it."' In eJoint Eastern and Southem Dist
New Yok Asbestos Litg, 897 F.2d 626, 632, (2d
Cir. 1990). Here, Malesko alleges that various
CSC policies or practices led to his injtuy-
assigning him to a room on the fifth floor,
forbidding him from using the elevator, and
failing to refill his heart medication
4
We also question, although need not decide, whether
the government contractor defense may ever be
invoked as a shield against Bir claims. As the Court
in Boye explained, the government contractor defense
exists to protect against situations where the
"application of star law[claitus] would frustrate specific
objectives of federal legislation." The Bizers cause of
action, however, was created to advancefaeral
constitutional interests. Such claims are not atate law
claims but rather arise under the US. Constitution-
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prescription- but neither he nor CSC claims
that the government played any role in
formulating or approving these policies or
practices. Because no allegation exists in the
record before the district court that the
government played any role in these decisions,
we conclude that the district court erred in
holding that CSC was protected from liability
by the government contractor defense. Se eg,
In ? Hawaii Ask-st Casa, 960 F.2d 806, 813
(9 Cir. 1992) (holding that suppliers of
insulation products containing asbestos to the
Navy could not invoke defense where
suppliers "simply failed to allege, let alone
establish, that...they were acting in compliance
with 'reasonably precise specifications'
imposed on them by the United States")
(quoting Boy'e, 487 U.S. at 512).
II. Cain A gzimt ItIhduad Dylants
The district court dismissed the BieM claims
against Jorge Urena on the ground that the
claims were time-barred. For the same reason,
Malesko, however, did not identify any of the
alleged "DOE" defendants listed on his
original complaint until February 2, 1999,
when he submitted an Amended Complaint
substituting Jorge Urena as "JOHN DOE
DEFENDANT # 1." On February 17, 1999,
Malesko moved for leave to file a second
amended complaint that would purportedly
have substituted additional CSC employees as
"DOE" defendants. It is therefore clear from
the record that the statute of limitations
expired on Malesko's Biw= claims before he
added or sought to add any individual
defendants. Malesko attempts to avoid this
conclusion by arguing that, pursuant to Fed.
R Gv. P. 15(c), the date of filing for his
amendments identifying individual defendants
may "relate back" to the timely date on which
the original complaint was filed. SeAsands v
UnState Litzs, Inc, 7 F.3d 1067, 1075 (2d
Cir. 1993) (stating that "'John Doe' pleadings"
can "be used to circumvent statutes of
the district court denied as "futile" Malesko's
motion to file a second amended complaint
substituting additional specific individuals for
"DOE" defendants. We review de now the
district court's dismissal of the BizeM claims
against Urena on the pleadings. SeJas, 166
F.3d at 49. We review the district court's
denial of leave to amend the complaint for
abuse of discretion. Id If that denial was
based on a legal interpretation, however, we
review the decision de nom
In New York, the statute of limitations for
bringing a Biwm action is three years from the
accrual of the claim. Se Chin u Bozer7 833
F.2d 21, 24 (2d Cir. 1987). The partied do not
dispute that Malesko's claim accrued on
March 28, 1994, the day on which he suffered
his heart attack while climbing the CSC stairs.
Thus, the statute of limitations on Malesko's
Bie claims expired on March 28, 1997, one
day after he filed his original complaint.
limitations" where "all the specifications of
Fed. R. Gv. P. 15(c) are met").
Under Rule 15(c), when an attempt is made to
bring in a new party, the date of the
amendment adding that party will "relate
back" to the date of the original complaint
only when (1) the claim arises out of the same
conduct originally pleaded and (2) within
(ordinarily) 120 days of the original filing date,
the party to be brought in by the amendment
(A) has receive such notice of the institution
of the action that the party will not be
prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the
merits, and (B) knew or should have known
that, but for a nastake warning d eity oqf tX
prper pazny the action would have been
brought against the party.
Fed. R Civ. P. 15(c)(3) (emphasis added).
Thus, in order to have the filing dates for the
Amended Complaint and second amended
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complaint relate back to the date of the
original Complaint, Malesko must show, inter
alka, that he failed to name Urena and other
specific (SC employees due to a "mistake
concerning the identification of the proper
party." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 (c)(B). A plaintiff is
not considered to have made such a
"mistake," however, is the plaintiff knew that
he was required to name an individual as a
defendant but did not do so because he did
not know the individual's identity. S&- Banow
v Weaheaidd Pdie Dep t' 66 F.3d 466, 470 (2d
Cir 1996)("Rule 15(c) does not allow an
amended complaint adding new defendants to
relate back if the newly-added defendants
were not named originally because the
plaintiff did not know their identities.")
Here, it is clear that Malesko believed that
there existed individual defendants who were
potentially liable for his injuries, but did not
know their exact identities prior to the
expiration of the statute of limitations. As
revealed by the caption from his original
complaint, Malesko "INTENDED TO
INDICATE OFFICERS AND MANGERS
AND GUARDS OF THE CORPORATE
DEFENDANT [(SC]," but he did not do so
because "THE NAMES OF SAID JOHN
DOE DEFENDANTS ARE PRESENTLY
UNKNOWN." Under these circumstances,
Malesko cannot avail himself of Rule 15(c)
such that his untimely substitution of
specifically named individuals for "DOE"
defendants may "relate back" to the date he
filed his original complaint. Se Tapia-Oniz v
Da 171 F.3d 150, 151-52 (2d dr. 1999)
(holding that plaintiff, who, in his original
complaint, sued "Doe" defendant officers
who allegedly applied excessive force, could
not "relate back" his amendment naming
specific officers two years after the statute of
limitations had run); Bantze; 66 F.3d at 470
(holding that plaintiff named "John Does"
because he did not know the arresting
officers' names and that, "since the new
names were [subsequently] added not to
correct a mistake but to correct a lack of
knowledge, the requirements of Rule 15(c) for
relation back are not met").
We therefore affirm the district court's
decision dismissing the Amended Complaint
as to Urena and denying Malesko's motion to
file the second amended complaint because
these claims were barred by the statute of
limitations.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the
district court's dismissal of Biwm claims
against defendant Urena and its denial of
leave to file the second amended complaint,
but vacate the district court's dismissal of
claims against (SC and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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Company Cannot Use Government Contractor Defense, 2d Cir. Says
Government ContactLidgtion Repofter
December 7, 2000
The Second Circuit has held that a contractor
cannot use the government contractor
defense to shield itself from liability for
personal injuries allegedly resulting from
company policies that the government did not
have a role in formulating. The court also
ruled that a Bivens action can be maintained
against a private company acting under a
federal contract. MalJko v Cornainal sema
Ojp., Na 99-7995 (2d Cir, Ot 6, 2000).
The Suit
John E. Malesko filed suit against
Correctional Services corporation in U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of
New York after he was injured in a fall at a
halfway house where he was serving a portion
of a criminal sentence. Malesko claimed that
in spite of his heart condition, an employee of
the halfway house made him climb flights of
stairs rather than use an elevator, and as a
result he suffered a heart attack and fell,
sustaining additional injuries. Correctional
services Corporation, a private company,
operated the halfway house under a contract
with the federal Bureau of Prisons. The suit
was filed pro se on March 27, 1997, and
named as additional defendants 10 John
Does, alleged to officers, managers, and
guards of the facility.
On February 2, 1999, Malesko's counsel filed
an amended complaint substituting Jorge
Urena, a CSC employee, for defendant john
Doe number one. Several days later CSC
moved to dismiss, and Malesko cross-moved,
seeking to file a second amended complaint
containing the names of other John Doe
defendants.
The Bivens Claims
The district court dismissed the amended
complaint on the grounds that it raised claims
under Biwe u Six UrnmNanzdAgrt ofthe
Federal Bwau <fNamiis, 403 US. 388 (1971),
which provides a cause of action for damages
against federal agents who violate
constitutional rights.
The court stated that a Bivens action can only
be bright against individual and held that
Malesko could not pursued (sic) the action
against CSC. The court arrived at this
conclusion after applying the reasoning of
FDIC v Me'p 510 US. 471 (1994), which
held that a Bivens claim will not lie against
agencies of the federal government.
The court also reasoned that even if a Bivens
action could be brought against a private
corporation, CSC was immune from liability
because it had a contract with the federal
government.
The motion to file a second amended
complaint was denied. The district court
stated that the statute of limitations had
expired on the Bivens claim and the
subsequent assertion of such claims against
additional defendants was time-barred. The
amendment would be futile, the court
explained, rejecting the argument that
amendment would relate back to the initial
filing date.
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The amended complaint against Jorge Urena
was also dismissed on limitations grounds.
Malesko appealed to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Circuit Judge Sonia Sotomayor, writing for the
appellate panel, stated that the lower court did
not elaborate on why Meyer precluded a
Bivens suit against CSC, a company that is not
a federal agency. De novo review of the issue
leads to the conclusion that such an action
can be pursued against a private corporation
acting under color of federal law, she said.
Pointing to Hanrm v Nofdk Sdtxrm Corp.,
156 F.3d 701 (6" Cir. 1998), the judge
explained that Meyer is not dispositive. Meyer
was concerned about the potentially huge
financial burden on the government, and the
same concerns do not exist in situations
involving private corporations.
Further, Bivens claims against federal officers
have been treated the same way as claims
against state officers under 42 U.S.C. sect.
1983, and corporations engaging in state
action can be sued under that section, she
continued. According to Hammons,
corporations engaging in federal action
should, by analogy, be subject to Bivens
claims. Private entities acting on behalf of the
federal government are not equivalent to
federal agencies, Judge Sotomayor ruled.
The Government Contractor Defense
With regard to the district court's decision on
immunity from suit, the judge stated that CSC
could not use the government contractor
defense. The defense provides that liability for
design defects in military equipment cannot
be imposed under state law when the United
States approved reasonably precise
specifications, the equipment conformed to
those specifications and the supplier warned
the government about dangers in the use of
the equipment that the government did not
know about. Although the defense developed
in the context of military contractors, it has
been applied more broadly by the courts,
Judge Sotomayor noted.
The judge held that it was not necessary to
address whether the circuit would apply the
defense in a non-military situation, nor was it
necessary to determine whether the defense
could be invoked as a shield against a bivens
action. This was the case because the defense
only shields a contractor from claims arising
out of actions where the government
exercised discretion and judgement in
approving precise specifications the
contractor must adhere to, she said.
In the case at bar Malesko claimed that CISCs
policy of forbidding him from using the
elevator led to his injury. Malesko did not
allege that the federal government played any
role in formulating or implementing the
policies, the judge elaborated. The lower court
was incorrect when it held that CSC was
shielded from liability by the government
contractor defense, Judge Sotomayor ruled.
The judge also found that the limitations
period expired on the Bivens claims before
Malesko added or sought to add additional
individual defendants.
The dismissal of the amended complaint
against Urena was affirmed, and Malesko was
not allowed to fiel the second amended
complaint. The district court's dismissal of
claims against CSC was vacated and the
matter was remanded for further proceedings.
Malesko is represented by Steven Pasternak of
Pasternak, Feldman & Plutnik in Livingston,
N.J.
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The defendants are represented by George P.
Stasiuk of Clifton, Budd & DeMaria in New
York, N.Y.
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Supreme Court Roundup;
Court to Consider Right to Sue Company Running Halfway House for Federal
Agency
The New York Times
Tuesday, March 6, 2001
Linda Greenhouse
The Supreme Court agreed today to decide
whether private companies that run prisons or
perform other traditionally governmental
functions for the federal government can be
sued for constitutional violations committed
by their employees.
The case is an appeal by a company that ran a
halfway house on Manhattan's East Side for
the federal Bureau of Prisons. An inmate
suffering from congestive heart failure alleged
in a suit for $4 million in damages that he was
denied use of the elevator and was forced to
walk up the stairs to his fifth floor room.
While climbing the stairs, he had a heart
attack, fell, and suffered an injury that left him
with permanent balance problems.
Under a 1971 Supreme Court decision
generally referred to as the Bivens case,
people whose rights are violated by federal
agents can sue for damages in federal court.
The Bivens doctrine has been extended to
permit suits against private employees who are
performing government functions.
But the court has never decided whether the
companies themselves - - more inviting
targets for lawsuits than individual defendants
because of their greater resources - - can be
sued. In this case, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Manhattan,
ruled in the fall that the suit could go forward;
it had not yet gone to trial.
The question of corporate liability for
damages has become increasingly important
as the government turns over the running of
prisons, hospitals, and even schools to private
companies. The defendant in this case is the
Correctional Services Corporation, based in
Sarasota, Fla., which was widely known in the
New York area under a former name, Esmor
Correctional Services Inc.
As Esmor, it ran a jail in Elizabeth, N.J., for
immigrants being detained by the Immigration
and Naturalization Service. After a riot there
in 1995, immigration officials blamed the
company for harassing and degrading the
immigrants in its charge and for failing to
keep the immigration service informed about
conditions. The halfway house at 15 East 31"
Street, known as Le Marquis, which Esmor
opened in 1991, was the subject of several
complaints. Staff turnover the first year was
nearly 100 percent. A federal inspection in
1992 found bare cupboards, with nothing for
the inmates to eat for breakfast, and 30
percent fewer staff members than called for in
the contract.
John E. Malesko, the plaintiff in this case, was
transferred to Le Marquis in February 1994 to
serve the final months of a federal prison
sentence for securities fraud. Because of his
heart condition, the staff at firt allowed him
to use the elevator to reach his fifth floor
room. But according to the accusations in his
lawsuit, on March 28, 1994, a guard forced
him to walk up the stairs and threatened to
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have him sent back to prison unless he was in
his room in time for a head count. Mr.
Malesko had a heart attack on the stairs.
In its appeal from the Second Circuit ruling,
Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, No.
00-860, the company is arguing that a 1994
Supreme Court decision barring a Bivens
damage suit against the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation should be interpreted
to bar similar suits against companies.
In a brief urging the justices not to hear the
appeal, Mr. Malesko's lawyers told the court:
"The privatization of core government
activities - - such as law enforcement - - may
save the government money, but should not
erode constitutional protections against those
acting color of state law."
There were also other actions at the court
today-
Credit Reporting
The justices agreed to resolve a dispute in the
lower courts over deadlines for suing credit
reporting companies over mishandled credit
reports.
A 1970 federal law, the fair Credit Reporting
Act, has a statute of limitations of two years,
but it is unclear whether this means two years
from the date of violation or two years from
the time a person who is injured
by the violation discovers it. The difference
between the two interpretations has
substantial practical consequences both for
the credit reporting industry and the for
consumers.
The case is an appeal by TRW Inc., one of the
biggest credit reporting companies, from a
ruling last year by the United States Court of
appeals for the Ninth circuit, in San
Francisco. That court, applying the more pro-
consumer standai, permitted a suit by a
woman named Adelaide Andrews, whose
identity - - including her Social Security
number, California drivers license number and
other identifying information - - had been
fraudulently assumed by a woman named
Andrea Andrews.
More than two years later, when trying to
refinance her mortgage, Adelaide Andrews
learned that her credit rating had been
damaged by the imposter's receipt of credit in
her name and subsequent failure to pay bills.
Her lawsuit asserts that TRW violated her
rights under the fair credit reporting act by
negligently releasing the personal information
that enabled Andrea Andrews to obtain credit.
The case is TRW Inc. v. Andrews, No. 00-
1045.
Copyright D 2001 The New York Tnz-s
Company
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00-1073 Owasso Independent School district No. I-011v. Falvo
Ruling Below (10h Cir., 229 F.3d 956):
Grades that students record on one another's homework and test papers and then repor ot
teacher contain information directly related to student and are maintained by person acting
for educational agency or institution and therefore are "education records" within meaning
of Family Education Rights and Privacy Act, which precludes federal funding for any
educational entity that maintains practice of allowing disclosure of such records without
parental consent.
Question Presented: Does Family Education Rights and Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C §1232 g,
which requires educational institutions to preserve confidentiality of "education records,"
which are defined as "those records, files, documents, and other materials which- (i)
contain information directly related to a student; and (ii) are maintained by an educational
agency or institution or by a person acting for such agency or institution," Section
1232g(a) (4) (A), prohibit public school teachers of presecondary school students from
utilizing their students to grade each other's homework papers, quizzes, and tests by having
students exchange papers and mark correct and incorrect answers thereon as teacher goes
over answers aloud in class?
FALVO, Plaintiff-Appellant,
V.
OWASSO INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendants -Appellees
MURPHY, Circuit Judge.
United States Court of Appeals,
for the Tenth Circuit
Decided October 4, 2000
I. INTRODUCTION
In the instant case, this court must decide
whether a practice employed by pre-
secondary school * * *teachers in the
Owasso Independent School District (the
"School District") of allowing their
students both to grade one another's tests
and other work and to call out their own
grades in class (the "grading practice")
violates either the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States
Constitution or the Family Education
Rights and Privacy Act ("FERPA").
Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1291, we conclude that although
the Fourteenth Amendment does not
preclude the grading practice, FERPA
does. The individual defendants,
however, are entitled to qualified
immunity because it was not clearly
established law that the grading practice
violated FERPA. This court therefore
affirms the district court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of all
defendants on the constitutional claim and
reverses the grant of summary judgment
in favor of the School District on the
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FERPA claim. Also as to the FERPA
claim, we affirm the grant of summary
judgment in favor of the individual
defendants on the plaintiff's claim for
monetary relief, but reverse the judgment
on the plaintiff's claim for injunctive
relief.
II. BACKGROUND
Kristja J. Falvo is the mother of Elizabeth,
Philip, and Erica Pletan, all who attended
school in the School District. Falvo
learned that a number of her children's
teachers would sometimes have their
students grade one another's work
assignments and tests and then would
have the students call out their own
grades to the teacher. During the 1997-98
and 1998-99 school years, Falvo
complained about this grading practice to
school counselors and to the School
District superintendent, claiming that it
severely embarrassed her children by
allowing other children to learn their
grades. Although Falvo was told that her
children always had the option of
confidentially reporting their grades to the
teacher, '* * the School District refused
to disallow the grading practice.
In October, 1998, when Falvo's children
were in the sixth, seventh, and eighth
grades, she brought a class action lawsuit
pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1983 against the
School District, Superintendent Dale
Johnson, Assistant Superintendent Lynn
Johnson, and Principal Rick Thomas (the
"individual defendants"), alleging the
grading practice violated Fourteenth
Amendment privacy rights and FERPA.
Before the district court resolved whether
to certify the class, Falvo moved for
declaratory and summary judgment on her
two claims. The School District filed a
cross-motion for summary judgment on
both claims. The district court applied the
test articulated in Flanagn u Munger, 890
F.2d. 1557, 1570 (10th Cir, 1989) and
concluded that the grading practice did
not implicate a constitutionally protected
privacy interest. Additionally, the district
court ruled that the grades subject to the
grading practice do not constitute
"education records" under FERPA.
Thus, the district court granted summary
judgment in favor of all defendants on
both claims.
Falvo then moved for reconsideration and
clarification of the district court's
judgment, arguing the court should have
granted relief in favor of Philip Pletan on
the Fourteenth Amendment claim
because, as a special education student, he
had a legitimate expectation of privacy in
his grades under the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA").
The district court denied that motion,
concluding that because Falvo did not
make a distinct claim under IDEA, she
could not premise a Fourteenth
Amendment claim on that statute.
On appeal, Falvo asserts the district court
erroneously granted summary judgment in
favor of the defendants, because the
grading practice violates both the
Fourteenth Amendment and FERPA.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
This court conducts a de now review of a
district court's summary judgment
decision. * * * Summary judgment is
appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions
on file, together with affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law. Fed.RCiv.P. 56(c). In applying
this standard, this court views the
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evidence and draws reasonable inferences
therefrom in a light most favorable to the
party opposing summary judgment. * * *
Although the instant case involves cross-
motions for summary judgment, this court
nonetheless views the evidence in a
manner most favorable to Falvo, because
she is the party challenging the district
court's grant of summary judgment.
B. The Fourteenth Amendment Claim
Falvo contends the right to privacy under
the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits
public disclosure of student's grades. She
thus argues the district court ered in
dismissing her Fourteenth Amendment
claim because the grading practice
employed by her children's teachers
impermissibly infringes upon that
constitutional privacy right. Although this
court acknowledges the existence of a
Fourteenth Amendment right to prevent
disclosure of certain types of personal
information, the school work and test
grades of pre-secondary school students
do not rise to the level of this
constitutionally-protected category of
information.
* * * In assessing whether a specific
category of information is constitutionally
protected, this court "must consider, (1) if
the party asserting the right has a
legitimate expectation of privacy [in that
information], (2) if disclosure serves a
compelling state interest, and (3) if
disclosure can be made in the least
intrusive manner." * Dener Pdieren's
PxaateAss'n v Lutertein, 660 F.2d 432,
435 (10" Cir.1981); see also Flanaga, 890
F.2d at 1570. Although this test's formula
seems to indicate this court must consider
all three factors, the actual application of
the test in prior cases demonstrates that
we need not address the second and third
factors if the first is not met. See Nilsa' v
Laycn CQy 45 F.3d 369, 371 (10h
ir.1995) * * In other words, if Falvo
and her children do not have a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the children's
school work and test grades, they have no
Fourteenth Amendment privacy right
protecting those grades from disclosure.
A party's expectation of privacy of
specific information is sufficiently
legitimate to warrant constitutional
protection only if that information "is
highly personal or intimate." Nscn, 45
F.3d at 372. Although this court
acknowledges that the school work and
test grades of pre-secondary school
students constitute somewhat personal or
intimate information, we cannot conclude
that these grades are so highly personal or
intimate that they fall within the zone of
constitutional protection; to hold
otherwise would trivialize the Fourteenth
Amendment. AadAlAeanderv Pfer, 93
F.2d 1348, 1350-51 (8th Cir.1993); Davk u
Budxr, 853 F.2d 718, 721 (9t Cir.1988); *
Falvo contends that she and her children
have a legitimate expectation of privacy in
these grades because two federal statutes,
FERPA and IDEA, provide just such an
expectation. This court has recognized
that "[t]he presence of privacy statutes
and regulations may inform our judgment
concerning the scope of the constitutional
right to privacy." Flamgam 890 F.2d at
1571. In several prior public disclosure
cases, however, this court has refused to
premise a constitutional privacy right
merely on the existence of state privacy
statutes. See id; Nion, 45 F.3d at 372;
Marn9h v Pena, 789 F.2d 836, 839 (10h
Cir.1986). * * * This court therefore must
similarly conclude that federal privacy
statutes standing alone cannot be the basis
for a Fourteenth Amendment right to
prohibit disclosure of personal
information. * * * Thus, contrary to
Falvo's contention, neither FERPA nor
160
IDEA can create a Fourteenth
Amendment privacy right; rather, the
grades themselves must warrant
constitutional protection.
Although this court's conclusion,
discussed ina, that FERPA prohibits
revelation of student's school work and
test grades informs our judgment about
the scope of the constitutional right to
prevent disclosure of personal
information, we cannot say the right to
prevent disclosure of pre-secondary
school work and test grades is a "deeply
rooted notion [ ] of fundamental personal
interest [ ] derived from the Constitution."
* * * Id Falvo and her children therefore
lack a sufficiently legitimate expectation of
privacy in those grades to claim a
constitutional right in their protection.
This court thus concludes the district
court properly granted summary judgment
in favor of the defendants on Falvo's
Fourteenth Amendment claim.
C FERPA Claim
1. JusdicJn
Although most courts have concluded
that a violation of FERPA may be the
basis for a civil rights lawsuit under 42
U.S.C § 1983, the parties have not raised
that issue in the instant case. * * *
Whether the alleged violation of FERPA
is actionable under 42 U.S.C § 1983,
however, may implicate this court's and
the district court's subject matter
jurisdiction over Falvo's FERPA claim. *
* ' Because the issue was not raised by the
parties, this court does not decide if
subject matter jurisdiction hinges on
whether a federal statute is remediable
under § 1983 or if that question is more
properly resolved pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Heeding
the lesson of Stal Conpary v Otizes for a
Better Eminwnt, we will assume, without
deciding, that subject matter jurisdiction is
implicated by the question whether 5 1983
provides a remedy for the alleged FERPA
violation and thus resolve that question
before addressing the merits of Falvo's
FERPA claim. * * *
In WHider a Vigina Harpital Ass'n, the
Supreme Court stated, "A plaintiff
alleging a violation of a federal statute will
be permitted to sue under 5 1983 unless
(1) the statute [does] not create
enforceable rights, privileges, or
immunities within the meaning of § 1983,
or (2) Congress has foreclosed such
enforcement of the statute in the
enactment itself." * * * 496 U.S. 498, 508,
110 S. Ct. 2510, 110 L.Ed.2d 455 (1990)
(quotations omitted) To resolve the first
part of this test, this court must decide
whether the. provision in question was
intend[ed] to benefit the putative plaintiff.
If so, the provision creates an enforceable
right unless it reflects merely a
congressional preference for a certain kind
of conduct rather than a binding
obligation on the government unit, or
unless the interest the plaintiff asserts is
too vague and amorphous such that it is
beyond the competence of the judiciary to
enforce. Id at 509, 110 S. Ct. 2510
(citations and quotations omitted).
The plain language of the relevant
provision of FERPA, 20 U.S.C 5
1232g(b)(1), reveals that it is intended to
protect the privacy of students and their
parents. Moreover, the sponsors of the
amendment to FERPA which added this
particular provision stated, "The purpose
of the Act is two-fold- to assure parents
of students . . . access to their education
records and to protect such individual's
rights to privacy by limiting the
transferability of their records without
their consent." 120 Cong. Rec. 39862
(Dec. 13, 1974) (Joint Statement in
Explanation of Buckley/Pell
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Amendment). The relevant provision of
FERPA, therefore, was intended to
benefit Falvo and her children.
Additionally, this provision reflects a
binding obligation on schools, rather than
a mere congressional preference for a
certain kind of conduct. Under the
provision, and educational agency or
institution is absolutely precluded from
receiving federal funds if it maintains a
policy or practice of allowing disclosure of
education records to unauthorized
individuals or entities without parental
consent. See 20 U.S.C § 1232g(b)(1). The
language of this provision is akin to other
statutory language which the Supreme
Court has interpreted as creating "precise
requirements." * * * Finally, as this
court's statutory analysis, ir-a, makes
clear, the interest which Falvo asserts is
neither vague nor amorphous and is thus
within the competence of the judiciary to
enforce. We therefore conclude 20 U.S.C
§ 1232g(b)(1) creates an enforceable right
within the meaning of § 1983.
This conclusion raises a rebuttable
presumption, under the second part of the
Wlder test, that Congress did not
impliedly foreclose a S 1983 remedy by
creating a comprehensive remedial
scheme within FERPA itself. * * * The
only remedy Congress provided within
FERPA itself is allowing the Secretary of
Education to cut off federal funding to
educational institutions that violate the
statute. See 20 U.S.C § 1232g(b), (f). In
FERPA, Congress also directed the
Secretary of Education to "establish or
designate an office and review board
within the Department [of Education]" to
investigate, process, review, and adjudicate
FERPA violations and complaints alleging
such violations. See id §1 232g(g). * * *
Ultimately, however, the only remedy
which a complaining parent or student
may obtain through these proceedings is
the same which Congress itself set out in
the statute: the Secretary of Education ,ay
terminate the violating institution's federal
funding. S&- 34 CF.R. § 99.67.
In Wnt, the Supreme Court concluded
that an administrative scheme in the
Federal Housing Act, which provided the
administering agency the power to audit,
enforce contracts, and to au qfflralfinds
was "insufficient to indicate a
congressional intention to foreclose §
1983 remedies." 479 U.S. at 428, 107 S.
Ct. 766, * * *. Pursuant to Supreme Court
precedent, therefore, this court must
conclude that the only remedy provided
for in FERPA and its associated
regulations- the termination of federal
funding- is not sufficiently
comprehensive to "raise a clear inference"
of congressional intent to foreclose a §
1983 remedy. * ** This court, therefore,
has subject matter jurisdiction over
Falvo's appeal of the district court's
dismissal of her FERPA claim, because
the specific violation of FERPA which
she alleged is actionable under § 1983.
2. Meits
In assessing Falvo's claim under FERPA,
this court shifts its analytical mode from
that employed in resolving her
constitutional claim. When asked to
pronounce the existence of a previously
unrecognized constitutional right, this
court must proceed with great caution,
because, "[bly extending constitutional
protection to an asserted right or liberty
interest, we, to a great extent, place the
matter outside the arena of public debate
and legislative action." Glucksh-g, 521
U.S. at 720, 117 S. Ct. 2258. * * * TJhis
court must go wherever the language and
intent of the statute take us. Should our
interpretation cause public discomfort or
impose undesired burdens, it is to the
source of the enactment, Congress, that
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those who are discomforted or burdened
must turn for relief. * * *
The statute [FERPA] defines "education
records" as "those records, files,
documents, and other materials which -(i)
contain information directly related to a
student, and (ii) are numintaei by an
educational agency or institution or by a
person acting for such agency or
institution." 20 US.C 5 1232g(a)(4)(A)
(emphasis added).
The district court granted the School
District's summary judgment motion on
Falvo's FERPA claim because it
concluded the grades of Falvo's children
which were revealed to other students
were not "maintained" by the School
District and thus do not constitute
"education records" within the meaning
of FERPA. In so ruling, the district court
gave deference to the interpretation set
out both in a 1993 letter (the "Rooker
letter") * * * written by LeRoy S. Rooker,
the director of the Family Policy
Compliance Office ("FPCO") within the
United States Department of Education,
and in a 1999 sworn declaration by
Rooker (the "Rooker declaration") that
the Rooker letter states the current
position of the FPCO regarding the
grading practice. On appeal, Falvo
contends the district court both
improperly deferred to the interpretation
in the Rooker letter and Rooker
declaration and misconstrued the statute.
This court agrees with both of these
contentions and thus concludes that the
district court erroneously determined the
term "education records" within FERPA
does not encompass the grades at issue
here.
The district court erred in granting
deference to the Rooker letter and
declaration for two reasons. First, as
discussed ifi a, the meaning of the terms
"education records" and "maintain" are
clear from the statute itself, and a court
can only defer to an agency's
interpretation if a statute is deemed
ambiguous. See (heuw U.S.A., Inc v
Natural Resans Defeme Caa Irr, 467
U.S. 837, 842-44, 104 S. Ct. 2778, 81
L.Ed.2d 694 (1984) * * *. Second, even if
the relevant statutory language was
ambiguous, the Supreme Court recently
announced that Chemn deference does
not extend to an interpretation contained
in an opinion letter issued by the
administering agency. See Chritemen v
Harnis Cwty, 529 U.S. 576, 120 S. Ct.
1655, 1662, 146 L.Ed.2d 621 (2000). The
district court thus erred in affording
Oum deference to the Rooker letter and
declaration.
The Supreme Court did state, however,
that interpretations contained in agency
opinion letters "are 'entitled to respect'
under our decision in Skidnvre v Sft? &
Co, 323 U.S. 134, 140 S. Ct. 161, 89 L.Ed.
124 (1944)." * * * Even if the language of
FERPA was ambiguous, the Rooker letter
and declaration would carry minimal
persuasive power under Skidnmne
A statement of qualification contained
earlier in the letter indicates that in issuing
the opinion, the FPCO may not have
thoroughly considered the issue before
this court. * * * Additionally, the Rooker
letter and declaration are bereft of any
reasoning underlying the rather
conclusory opinion that grades written
down by other students and announced to
the teacher are not "maintained" as
required under FERPA. The Rooker
letter's power to persuade is further
diminished because it rests its statutory
interpretation on the conclusion that the
grades are not " 'maintained' by an
educational agency or institution,"
ignoring the broader language of FERPA
which encompasses records "maintained
by an educational agency or institution or
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by a persarz aaigfor sudh agerxy or intitutio."
20 U.S.C § 1232g(a)(4)(A)(ii) (emphasis
added). The Rooker declaration, however,
which was submitted in the instant case
over five years after the Rooker letter was
issued, at least indicates the FPCO's
interpretation of FERPA as it relates to
the grading practice has been consistent
for some time. Nonetheless, because the
Rooker letter and declaration lack
sufficient reasoning, fail to account for the
breadth of FERPA's language, and
indicate the FPCO's somewhat cursory
and purely hypothetical consideration of
the issue before this court, the
interpretation of FERPA offered in those
documents is not persuasive.
Based purely on the language of the
statute itself, this court concludes the
grades which students record on one
another's homework and test papers and
then report to the teacher * * * constitute
"education records" under FERPA. * * *
There is no dispute that the grades which
students place on each other's papers and
then report to the teacher "contain
information directly related to a student"
and thus satisfy the first element of the
statutory definition of "education record."
* * *1, To constitute an "education record,"
however, these grades must also be
"maintained .. . by a person acting for [an
educational] agency or institution." * * *
The undisputed evidence indicates that at
least some grades which students give one
another and report to the teacher are then
recorded in the teacher's grade book. At
that later time when the grades are placed
in the teacher's grade book, they are
maintained . .. by a person acting for [an
educational] agency or institution" and
constitute "education records." * * *
FERPA itself provides, "The term
'education records' does not include [ ]
records of instructional ... personnel ...
which are in the sole possession of the
maker thereof and uhich am not aassible or
wwalal to any aherpeson excapt a substite..
." Id§ 1232g(a)(4)(B)(i) (emphasis added).
* * Therefore, grades disclosed to
people other than substitute teachers,
such as students, do qualify as "education
records." Because grade books, except
those disclosed only to substitutes, fall
within the statutory definition of
"education records" and because one
element of that definition is that the
records are "maintained," grade books
and the grades within are necessarily
"maintained" by a person acting for the
educational institution, as required by
FERPA.
The School District contends the language
of § 1232g(a)(4)(B)(i) categorically
excludes grade books, and hence, the
grades at issue in the instant case, from
the definition of "education records." * *
* If 1232g(a)(4)(B)(i) excludes records
such as grade books from the definition
of "education records" in an unqualified
manner, as the School District urges, the
language "and which are not accessible or
revealed to any other person except a
substitute" becomes meaningless. If
grade books never constitute "education
records," teachers would be free under
FERPA to reveal them to anyone, thus
obviating the need to provide in the
statute for allowing disclosure to
substitute teachers.
In its petition for rehearing, the School
District argues that interpreting S
1232g(a)(4)(B)() as merely allowing for
the disclosure of grade books to
substitutes, as this court does, "renders
subsection 1232g(a)(4)(B)(i) superfluous,
because subsection 1232g(a)(4)(B)(i)
already provides that it is not a violation
of FERPA to allow access to education
records" by substitute teachers. As just
explained, however, it is the School
District's construction of §
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1232ga)(4)(B)(i) which renders language
within that subsection meaningless. * * *
The School District, therefore, is wrong to
assert that § 1232g(a)(4)(B)(i), which
allows a teacher to disclose a grade book
to a substitute only, is superfluous because
such disclosure is already permitted under
§ 1232g(b)(1)(A). Section
1232g(a)(4)(B)(i), unlike section
1232g(b)(1) (A), permits a teacher to reveal
a grade book to a substitute uithowt Azing
to also show it to a pant. Contrary to the
School District's challenge, therefore, our
interpretation of § 1232g(a)(4)(B)(i) does
not render that subsection superfluous,
but is, in fact, the only reasonable way to
construe that provision.
This court must next resolve whether
grades are also "maintained ... by a
person acting for [an education] agency or
institution" at the more preliminary stage
when one student simply writes the grade
of a fellow student on homework and test
papers. * * * The student's transmission
of that recorded grade, when the teacher
later receives the grade, is necessarily done
to allow the teacher to use the grade in
some fashion. * * * In so assisting the
teacher, the correcting student becomes
"a person acting for [an educational]
agency or institution." * * *The grade the
correcting student places on the paper is
also "maintained, because that student is
preserving the grade until the time it is
reported to the teacher for further use.
Section 1232g(a)(2) states that educational
institutions must provide parents "an
opportunity for a hearing ... to challenge
the content of . . . education records."
The School District Asserts that Congress
could not have reasonably intended to
allow parents to challenge in a hearing the
accuracy of a grade placed on a student's
homework or test by another student.
The School District, relying on a
statement from the legislative history,
contends Congress only meant to afford
parents a procedural right to challenge
"institutional records."
To the contrary, Congress could have
sensibly intended to provide parents a
means to challenge the accuracy of grades
on individual homework and test papers.
Indeed, a challenge to "institutional
records" such as a semester grade might
necessarily require an investigation into
the accuracy of the individual homework
and test grades used to calculate the final
semester grade. * * * Reading §
1232g(a)(2) on its face, therefore, does
not, as the School District contends,
illuminate the meaning of the term
"education records."
Finally, this court disagrees that §
1232g(b)(4)(A) ** * vitiates our statutory
construction. ** * ... [N]othing in this
court's interpretation of the term
"education records" would prohibit a
central custodian from maintaining these
access records, as the School District
seems to fear.
In sum, because a reading of the plain
language of FERPA demonstrates that the
term "education records" encompasses
the grades at issue in the instant case, this
court concludes the district court erred
when it resolved that the grading practice
did not offend FERPA. * * *
D. Quahfed 1mmunity
In their cross-motion for summary
judgment, the individual defendants
argued they are entitled to qualified
unmunity. Contrary to Falvo's assertion
that this issue is not properly before this
court because the individual defendants
failed to file a cross-appeal, this court may
affirm the district court's ruling [that
qualified immunity does not protect the
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individual defendants] on any basis
supported by the record. ***
When a public official raises a qualified
immunity defense in a § 1983 lawsuit, the
plaintiff bears the burden of establishing
(1) "that the defendant's actions violated a
federal constitutional or statutory right,"
and (2) "that the right violated was clearly
established at the time of the conduct at
issue." ** * Having concluded that the
grading practice violates FERPA, this
court must further determine whether
Falvo has demonstrated that the right she
and her children enjoy under FERPA was
clearly established at the time the
individual defendants permitted the
grading practice.
A right is "clearly established" when "[t]he
contours of the right [are] sufficiently
clear that a reasonable official would
understand that what he is doing violates
that right." A nemon v Craton, 483 U.S.
635, 640, 107 S. Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523
(1987). * * * Falvo has presented no case
law whatsoever which concludes that
FERPA creates a right to prevent the
disclosure of homework, test, or similar
grades, nor is this court aware of any such
legal authority. * * * The individual
defendants are thus entitled to qualified
immunity in the instant suit. * * *
Because the qualified immunity doctrine
only protects these individual defendants
from liability for monetary damages and
not from injunctive remedies, however,
Falvo may pursue a claim for injunctive
relief against these individual defendants
in their official capacities. * **
IV CONCLUSION
Because the grading practice which Falvo
challenges does not implicate a
Fourteenth Amendment right, this court
AFFIRMS the District Court for the
Northern District Of Oklahoma's grant of
summary judgment in favor of all
defendants on the Fourteenth
Amendment claim. Nevertheless, that
grading practice does violate FERPA, and
we thus REVERSE the district court's
grant of summary judgment in favor of
the School District on Falvo's FERPA
claim. * * *
On the basis of qualified immunity, this
court also AFFIRMS the grant of
summary judgment in favor of the
individual defendants on Falvo's FERPA
claim for monetary relief. Because
qualified immunity does not protect the
individual defendants from liability for
injunctive relief, however, we REVERSE
the district court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of the individual
defendants on Falvo's FERPA claim for
injunctive relief. This court REMANDS
for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
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Students Checking Each Other's Work May Not Make Grade; Court to
Rule on Possible Rights Violation
The Washington Post
Sunday, July 15, 2001
Greg Toppo
Associated Press
When Alicia Bata needs quick results
from a quiz in her Spanish class, she has
her students pass their work to
classmates and then goes over the
answers with them. In a few minutes, she
knows who understood the lesson and
who did not.
"They are paying a lot more attention
when they are correcting each other's
[papers] in the classroom together than if
I were," said Bata, who teaches in
Cavalier, N.D.
That practice could be in jeopardy because
the Supreme Court has agreed to decide if
swapping papers to correct them violates
students' privacy rights.
Teachers gathered for the National
Education Association convention earlier
this month were divided on the issue.
They said they regularly must balance the
need to give students timely feedback with
the confidentiality of their grades.
The issue arose in 1998, when Kristja J.
Falvo sued the Owasso, Okla., school
district, contending that her three children
were embarrassed when classmates graded
each other's work and called out grades to
the teacher.
A federal judge rejected her claim. The
10th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in
Denver, however, ruled last year that the
grading practice violated the federal
Family Education Rights and Privacy Act,
which prohibits schools from releasing
students' records without parents' written
consent.
Officials with Oklahoma school district
and at the NEA say the case raises doubts
about many other forms of exhibiting or
releasing students' work.
"I think it can be read to cover any work,"
Michael Simpson, the NEA's assistant
general counseL
He said the case could prohibit teachers
from allowing parent volunteers to check
papers. It could also prevent schools from
displaying graded student artwork and
science projects.
Teachers said the Denver ruling has made
superintendents and principals think twice
about publishing honor rolls, "student of
the month" lists or lists of students with
perfect attendance because the citations
reflect confidential records.
Shannon Fornes, an eighth-grade U.S.
history teacher in Bismarck, N.D., said
asking students to swap papers is essential
for her because she teaches five classes
and 130 students a day.
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"If in some cases there's going to be
immediate feedback, it has to happen in
the classroom, and so the kids are either
going to have to correct their own work
or exchange papers and do some
correcting," she said.
Maureen Pontarelli, a sixth-grade teacher
in West Greenwich, R.I., agreed.
"The quicker the reinforcement, especially
if the kid is not mastering the concept, the
better it is going to be for remediating
that," she said.
Pontarelli said teachers battle the
perception that those who let children
grade each other's papers go home at
night and "watch the soap operas, sit on
the couch eating bonbons with their feet
up.
As an indication of the complexity of the
issue, most teachers said that, as parents,
they see it a bit differently, and do not
necessarily like the idea of students
grading each other's papers.
John Marshall, a social studies teacher at
Mount Hope High School in Bristol, RI.,
said he never lets his students correct or
even see each other's papers. "I don't
think it's right. I think it's my
responsibility to grade those papers."
Tests and quizzes come back face-down,
he said, sparing embarrassment to
students who earn low grades. Marshall
also lets students decide if they want their
work displayed.
About the only things on public display
most days, he said, are students'
performances in debates and discussions.
Gail Kono, a fifth-grade teacher in
Waipahu, Hawaii, said paper-swapping is
more widely accepted in elementary
school, where it helps students learn to
work together.
"The first thing you have to do is have the
students in your class understand that they
need to respect each other, that
everybody's strong points are in different
areas," she said. "It doesn't mean that they
can't do it; it just means that they need a
little help."
Most teachers, Pontarelli said, would
never let students grade important tests or
those that have a significant effect on a
student's grades.
She said the controversy is baffling
because teachers often hear the complaint
from the business world that public
school students graduate without the
ability to work together.
"In the real world, there are people who
are going to see your work product," she
said. "You know what? In the real world,
there are people who are going to be
critical of your work product."
Copyright 0 2001 The Washington Post
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Supreme Court to Hear Owasso Grading Case
The Daily Oklahoman
Tuesday, June 26, 2001
Chris Casteel
The Supreme Court agreed Monday to
decide whether the Owasso School
District violated the privacy of students by
making them grade each other's papers
and call out results.
The 10th Circuit Court of Appeals in
Denver ruled last year that the longtime
practice of student grading was prohibited
by a federal law aimed at keeping
"education records" private.
School grades weren't the kind of
information that warranted constitutional
protection, but they did fall under the
clear language of the Family Education
Rights and Privacy Act, the court
said. The 10th Circuit opinion reversed
U.S. District Judge Terry C Kern, who
had sided with the Owasso School
District.
The Owasso district appealed to the U.S.
Supreme Court, arguing that the circuit
court had wrongly decided the case, and
that the decision "has created confusion
and apprehension among public
educators throughout the nation regarding
the legality of a common and long-
standing educational practice."
The Supreme Court will hear the case in
its next term, which begins in October.
The Bush administration - through the
Solicitor General - also disagreed with the
10th Circuit Court's decision but advised
the Supreme Court earlier this month not
to take the case.
"In our view.., the court of appeals erred
in concluding that (the federal privacy
law) prohibits students from grading the
homework and tests of other students in
the classroom," the Solicitor General said
in a brief. "Nonetheless, we believe that
review by the Court is not warranted at
this time."
The 10th Circuit decision was the first of
its kind, so there was no conflict among
the appeals courts to clear up, the Solicitor
General said. Moreover, the Solicitor
General argued that the 10th Circuit
decision resulted in part from a lack of
clear guidelines from the U.S. Department
of Education about what kinds of records
must be kept private.
"In response to the court of appeals'
decision, the (Education) Department has
determined that it will issue regulations or
other formal guidance setting forth a
more detailed analysis of the meaning of
'education records"' under the privacy act,
the Solicitor General said.
The case against the school district in
Owasso, north of Tulsa, was filed in 1998
by Kristja J. Falvo, whose three children
attended school in Owasso. She com-
plained that her children were
embarrassed by the practice of having to
call out results of their work after it was
graded by another student.
Falvo was told by school district officials
that her children could report their grades
privately to their teachers. But the 10th
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Circuit Court said the violation of privacy
occurred simply by having another
student grade the work.
Falvo said student grading violated the
constitutional right to privacy and the
Family Education Rights and Privacy Act.
But the district judge and the 10th Circuit
Court said there were no constitutional
violations. The 10th Circuit Court said the
district's violations related to the federal
statute.
Copyright © 2001 The Oklahoman
Publishing Company
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00-1514 Raygor v. Regents of University of Minnesota
Ruling Below (Minn., 620 N.W.2d 680, 69 U.S.L.W. 1406, 84 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1037):
Provision of federal supplemental jurisdiction statute that tolls statute of limitations on state
law claims while they are pending in federal court, 28 U.S.C §1367(d), violates 116
Amendment as applied to claims against unconsenting states.
Question Presented: Is tolling provision of 28 U.S.C. §1367(d), insofar as it applies to state
defendant, unconstitutionaP
REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA, Appellant
V.
Lance RAYGOR and James Goodchild, Respondents
Supreme Court of Minnesota
Decided Jan. 4, 2001
BLATZ, Chief Justice.
'This case raises the issue of whether the
tolling provision of the federal
supplemental jurisdiction statute,
codified at 28 U.S.C 1367(d) (1993),
applies to toll the statute of limitations
for Minnesota Human Rights Act claims
against the Regents of the University of
Minnesota during the time the state law
claims were pending in federal court.
Respondents Lance Raygor and JamesGoodchild brought this action against
appellant Regents of the University of
Minnesota (Universit) alleging agediscrimination in violation of the
Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHR{A).
The University brought a motion todismiss, arguing that the statute oflimitations for the MHRA claims had
expired. In granting the motion, the statedistrict court found that the statute of
limitations for respondents' MH-IRA
claims was not tolled under the federal
supplemental jurisdiction statute and that
equitable tolling did not apply to the
facts in this case; therefore, the claims
were not timely. The Minnesota Court of
Appeals reversed, concluding that
section 1367(d) did toll the state statute
of limitations and that, in the alternative,
the MHRA claims were equitably tolled
during the pendency of the federal
district court action. We reverse, holding
that the application of section 1367(d) in
this case is an unconstitutional
infringement on state sovereign
immunity in violation of the Eleventh
Amendment of the United StatesConstitution, and that the district courtdid not abuse its discretion in concludingthat equitable tolling does not apply.
In August 1995, respondents filed
charges of discrimination with the
innesota Department of Human
Rights alleging age discrimination by the
Unversity of Minnesota in certain
employment decisions. The department
dismissed the claims on July 17, 1996,
and advised each respondent by letterthat he could bring a civil action against
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the University in state district court
within 45 days of receipt of the letter.
Rather than filing in state court,
respondents filed separate actions in the
federal district court for the District of
Minnesota on or about August 29, 1996,
alleging violations of the federal Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 29
U.S.C. %5 621-634 (1999), and the
Minnesota Human Rights Act,
Minn.Stat. ch. 363 (2000). In its answers,
the University raised Eleventh
Amendment immunity and lack of
jurisdiction as affirmative defenses. The
federal actions were consolidated. In
June 1997, the University served and
filed a motion to dismiss the complaints
pursuant to Fed.RCiv.P. 12(b)(1),
arguing that the Eleventh Amendment
bars suits in federal court against a state
by citizens of that or another state. The
federal district court granted the motion
by order filed July 14, 1997, dismissing
the claims without prejudice.
Respondents appealed the federal district
court's decision to the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals. The appeal was stayed.
On January 11, 2000, the United States
Supreme Court held in Eind v Flonid
Bd cfRegnts, 528 U.S. 62, 120 S.Ct. 631,
145 L.Ed.2d 522 (2000), that the
Eleventh Amendment is a valid defense
to an Age Discrimination in
Employment Act claim against a state.
After Eind was decided, respondents
moved to withdraw the appeal, and the
Eighth Grcuit Court of Appeals
dismissed the appeal.
Meanwhile, on August 1, 1997,
respondents commenced this action in
state district court alleging age
discrimination under the MIHRA. The
action was stayed while the federal
appeal was still pending; however, the
stay was lifted on December 31, 1998,
for the limited purpose of deciding the
University's summary judgment motion.
In moving for summary judgment, the
University claimed that the action was
barred by the state statute of limitations
because respondents failed to file their
claims in state district court within 45
days of receiving notice that the
Minnesota Human Rights Department
had dismissed the claims. See Minn.Stat.
5 363.06, subd. 3, 363.14, subd. 1(a)(1)
(2000). The state district court granted
the motion, * * * concluding that the
limitations period for the state action
was not tolled while the federal action
was pending and that equitable tolling
did not apply to extend the limitations
period.
Respondents sought review of the state
district court's judgment in the court of
appeals. The court of appeals reversed,
concluding that 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d)
tolled the statute of limitations for
respondents' MI-IRA claims during the
pendency of the federal district court
action. Se Raygor v Unisity <f MiM,
604 N.W.2d 128, 133 (Minn.App.2000).
Alternatively, the court of appeals
concluded that respondents' claims were
equitably tolled while their federal
district court action was pending. See id
at 134.
I.
This case presents us with the question
of whether the tolling provision of the
federal supplemental jurisdiction statute
should apply to toll the statute of
limitations for a state law claim against a
state defendant, in light of the immunity
afforded the state by the Eleventh
Amendment. In consideration of this
issue, we first review the supplemental
jurisdiction statute and the Eleventh
Amendment.
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In United Mire Wokees v Gilbs, the
United States Supreme Court recognized
the common law doctrine of pendent
jurisdiction, which permits a federal
court to hear state law claims over which
the federal court would not otherwise
have jurisdiction when the state law
claims are joined with a related federal
claim. 383 U.S. 715, 725, 86 S.Ct. 1130,
16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966). To be related for
purposes of pendent jurisdiction, the
claims "must derive from a common
nucleus of operative fact." Id Congress
codified the doctrine of pendent
jurisdiction at 28 U.S.C S 1367, known
as the supplemental jurisdiction statute.
Subdivision (a) provides:
Except as provided in subsections (b)
[dealing with diversity jurisdiction] and
(c) [discretionary dismissal of
supplemental claims] or as expressly
provided otherwise by Federal statute, in
any civil action of which the district
courts have original jurisdiction, the
district courts shall have supplemental
jurisdiction over all other claims that are
so related to claims in the action within
such original jurisdiction that they form
part of the same case or controversy
under Article III of the United States
Constitution. Such supplemental
jurisdiction shall include claims that
involve the joinder or intervention of
additional parties.
28 U.S.C § 1367(a) (1993).
At issue in this case is subdivision (d) of
section 1367, which tolls the state statute
of limitations for claims asserted under
supplemental jurisdiction while the
claims are pending in federal court.
Subdivision (d) also assures a 30-day
period in which to bring a state action
after a supplemental claim is dismissed
by the federal court: *
* * ,By its plain language, section
1367(d) applies to "any claim" asserted
under section 1367(a); however, the
University argues that this federal statute
cannot trump the protections afforded
the University by the Eleventh
Amendment.
Critical to our analysis of section
1367(d)'s effect in this case is an
understanding of the Eleventh
Amendment. The Eleventh Amendment
provides that "[tlhe Judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of
the United States by Citizens of another
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State." U.S. Const. amend. XI.
Notwithstanding this express language,
the Eleventh Amendment has long been
interpreted to also prohibit citizens from
pursuing claims against their own state in
federal court. Se Ham v Lcusianz, 134
U.S. 1, 15, 10 S.Ct. 504, 33 L.Ed. 842
(1890). The protections of the Eleventh
Amendment exist unless the state has
unequivocally consented to suit in
federal court, or Congress has
unequivocally abrogated state immunity
in order to effectuate the provisions of
the Fourteenth Amendment. See Seride
Trle v Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54-55, 116
S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996);
Kentudey v Graham 473 U.S. 159, 169,105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985).
Because there is no dispute that the
University is an "arm" of the State of
Minnesota, the University is entitled to
the protections of the Eleventh
Amendment in a suit brought by citizens
of Minnesota in a federal court. See
Tneimv Unizemsity qMnm, 73 F.3d 816,
819 (8th Cir.1996).
173
Because respondents then filed the
MIHRA claim against the University in
state district court after the 45-day
statute of limitations set forth in
Minn.Stat. § 363.14, subd. 1(a)(1) (2000)
expired, we must decide if section
1367(d) can be applied to toll the statute
of limitations on claims dismissed under
an assertion of Eleventh Amendment
immunity in federal court. The
University argues that the Eleventh
Amendment is an automatic
jurisdictional bar preventing original and
supplemental jurisdiction from ever
attaching, thus preventing the application
of tolling under section 1367(d).
Respondents argue that the Eleventh
Amendment is a waivable affirmative
defense that permits supplemental
jurisdiction to attach until immunity is
successfully asserted, thereby allowing
the statute of limitations to be tolled
under section 1367(d) until the case is
dismissed from federal court.
Underlying the parties' positions is a
basic disagreement as to how the
Eleventh Amendment operates as a
jurisdictional defense. While we do not
solve this dispute, we recognize that the
Eleventh Amendment is a jurisdictional
defense, but that it has unique
characteristics not always shared with
other limitations on federal jurisdiction.
Indeed, the United States Supreme Court
has long recognized Eleventh
Amendment immunity as a limit on the
reach of the federal judiciary. Sa, eg,
Seinoe Tne, 517 U.S. at 72-73, 116
S.Ct. 1114 ("The Eleventh Amendment
restricts the judicial power under Article
III."); Pennhws4 465 U.S. at 98, 104 S.Ct.
900 ("[Tihe fundamental principle of
sovereign immunity limits the grant of
judicial authority in Art. III * *
Misswi v Fiske, 290 U.S. 18, 25, 54 S.Ct.
18, 78 L.Ed. 145 (1933) ("The Eleventh
Amendment is an explicit limitation of
the judicial power of the United States.").
Nonetheless, while recognizing the
Eleventh Amendment as a constraint on
the exercise of federal court jurisdiction,
the Court has also consistently
acknowledged two characteristics that
distinguish Eleventh Amendment
immunity from typical subject-matter
jurisdiction limitations. * * *First, a party
entitled to Eleventh Amendment
protection may waive immunity and
submit to federal court jurisdiction. See
ClA u Barant 108 U.S. 436, 447, 2
S.Ct. 878, 27 L.Ed. 780 (1883) (stating
that Eleventh Amendment immunity is a
"personal privilege" that a state may
waive). This differs from typical
jurisdictional requirements, such as
diversity jurisdiction, where the parties
cannot confer jurisdiction by waiver or
consent. See Irsuranx Cap. <f Iitand u
Capagnie des Bawcite de Guire 456 U.S.
694, 702, 102 S.Ct. 2099, 72 L.Ed.2d 492
(1982) ("[N]o action of the parties can
confer subject-matter jurisdiction upon a
federal court."). Second, a federal court
is not required to raise an Eleventh
Amendment defense sua sparQ whereas
jurisdictional defects in general must be
raised by the court if not addressed by
the parties. Cwaqm Patsy v Bad jf
Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 515 n. 19, 102 S.Ct.
2557, 73 L.Ed.2d 172 (1982) ("[B]ecause
the State may, under certain
circumstances, waive this [Eleventh
Amendment] defense, we have never
held that it is jurisdictional in the sense
that it must be raised and decided by this
Court on its own motion"), with Imuranx
Cap. fIMlang 456 U.S. at 702, 102 S.Ct.
2099 ("[A] court, including an appellate
court, will raise lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction on its own motion.").
* * *We conclude that application of the
tolling provision violates the Eleventh
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Amendment, because the Eleventh
Amendment prohibits Congress from
extending the state's liability to suit in
state court via the state's unconsented
presence in federal court. Specifically, the
Eleventh Amendment does not permit
Congress to affect the liability of the
University as to a state law claim in state
court when the University did not
consent to federal jurisdiction.
II.
The parties do not dispute that the
Eleventh Amendment will bar a federal
action against a state unless Congress has
unequivocally abrogated the states'
sovereign immunity in enacting
legislation pursuant to section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment or the state has
waived its sovereign immunity. This
principle is supported by Supreme Court
case law. Se Seinde Trilbe 517 U.S. at
55, 116 S.CG. 1114. Section 5 is an
affirmative grant of power giving
Congress the authority to "enforce, by
appropriate legislation," the equal
protection guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, 5
5. Here, neither party contends that
section 1367 effectuates a valid
abrogation of state sovereign immunity.
Absent valid abrogation of theUniversity's sovereign immunity through
section 1367, the federal court could not
exercise jurisdiction over the
supplemental claims against the
University without its consent. TheUniversity did not consent; instead, it
asserted Eleventh Amendment immunity
as an affirmative defense in its answer in
the federal district court, and later as abasis for the motion to dismiss in federal
court. As a result, the action wasdismissed from the federal court system
and the MHPuA claims were
subsequently filed in state district court.
The tentacles of section 1367 were not
completely severed when the federal
district court dismissed the supplemental
claims, however. Allowing tolling under
section 1367(d) would alter the
University's position in state court by
requiring the University to answer a
claim in state court that would otherwise
be barred by the state statute of
limitations. Because Congress cannot,
absent valid abrogation of sovereign
immunity, extend federal judicial power
against unconsenting states, it follows
that Congress cannot impose a penalty
on a state defendant for being named,
without its consent, as a defendant in
federal court. To allow such a result
would, in effect, penalize the
unconsenting state defendant for the
other party's failed attempt to sue the
state in federal court. The Eleventh
Amendment does not permit Congress
to extend this federal judicial power over
the states.
This case differs from A den [v. Maine] in
that the contested claims here are notfederal claims, but rather state law claims
from which the University has noimmunity in state court. So- Minn.Stat. 5363.01, subds. 17, 28 (2000) (defining
"employer" under the MHRA to include
the state, its departments, agencies, andpolitical subdivisions). However, we readAlden to require that the University's
waiver of imunity be limited to the
parameters set forth by state statute. 527U.S. at 749, 119 S.Ct. 2240 ("[T1heimunity of a sovereign in its owncourts has always been understood to be
within the sole control of the Sovereignitself."). Thus, as defined by state law,
the University's exposure to MHRA suitin this case existed only for the 45-dayperiod following respondents'
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notification of dismissal of charges by
the Department of Human Rights. See
Minin.Stat. § 363.14, subd. 1(a)(1).
Furthermore, the state's waiver of
sovereign immunity for MHRA claims
timely filed in state court does not
diminish the University's Eleventh
Amendment protections from federal
judicial power with respect to MI-IRA
claims. The University's "constitutional
interest in immunity encompasses not
merely dxther it may be sued, but whev it
may be sued." Peostm, 465 U.S. at 99,
104 S.Ct. 900. Therefore, the general
waiver of immunity in state court is not a
waiver of the University's Eleventh
Amendment immunity in the federal
courts. See Pemhbas 465 U.S. at 99 n. 9,
104 S.Ct. 900.
Thmugh the federal tolling provision,
respondents seek to expand the
University's liability exposure by
extending the time in which the MHRA
claims can be filed in state court. Here,
as in AIb Congress has enacted
legislation impacting an unconsenting
state defendant's liability for suit in that
state's own courts. The Eleventh
Amendment does not allow this exercise
of federal power over an unconsenting
state. * *
We also reject respondents' argument
that tolling is required in the interests of
judicial economy. Judicial economy and
efficiency were central principles behind
the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990,
which included section 1367. See 136
Cong. Rec. S17580 (1990). * * *
Similarly, we conclude that policy
considerations cannot override Eleventh
Amendment limitations on the authority
of Congress to affect claims against the
University in state court.
Extension of the University's exposure
to suit in state court because a claim
barred by the Eleventh Amendment has
been filed against it in federal court is an
infringement on the University's
Eleventh Amendment immunity.
Accordingly, we hold that section
1367(d) does not toll the state statute of
limitations on the MHRA claims against
the University.
III.
Even though section 1367(d) does not
apply to toll the statute of limitations, the
court of appeals held, in the alternative,
that the limitations period should be
tolled under equitable principles. It is
within the discretion of the district court
to grant or deny equitable relief. Sw
Nadeau v Coo2ty <f Ranwey 277 N.W.2d
520, 524 (Minn.1979). The district
court's decision will be reversed only
upon a clear showing that such
discretion has been abused. Sw id
Respondents argue that equitable tolling
is warranted because they elected to
pursue their MHRA claims in federal
court with the good faith belief that the
federal court had jurisdiction over the
claims. The district court acknowledged
that at the time the federal actions were
filed, there was some confusion
surrounding the question of whether
Eleventh Amendment immunity should
apply to the federal Age Discrimination
in Employment Act claim. The district
court found, however, that under
Pennhuat it was clear the federal district
court could not exercise jurisdiction over
the supplemental MHRA claims. Noting
the limited scope of the equitable tolling
remedy and failing to find any other
grounds sufficient to invoke the remedy,
the district court found that the
respondents' election to pursue their
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MHRA claims in federal court did not
justify equitable tolling.
In reversing the district court, the court
of appeals did not discuss the district
court's analysis or provide any reason to
conclude that the district court abused its
discretion. Our careful review of the
record compels the conclusion that the
district court did not abuse its discretion
when it denied respondents the remedy
of equitable tolling.
Because section 1367 does not toll the
state statute of limitations for the MIRA
claim against the University and because
the district court acted within its
discretion in deciding that equitable
tolling did not apply, we reverse the
court of appeals and reinstate the district
court's judgment that the claims were
not timely filed.
Reversed.
PAGE, J., took no part in the
consideration or decision of this case
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Supreme Court to Review Age Discrimination Case
Thursday, June 7, 2001
Devin Griffiths, Daily Texan
The U.S. Supreme Court announced
Monday that it will review allegations of
age discrimination at the University of
Minnesota in a case that could have an
affect on state universities nationwide.
In 1996, two University of Minnesota
staff members sued the university under
federal and state age discrimination laws
after being demoted. The plaintiffs, Lance
Raygor and James Goodchild, were both
50 years old at the time.
The Supreme Court will review a lower
court ruling concerning the Federal Age
Discrimination Act of 1990. In that ruling,
the lower court said that the 11th
Amendment protected state institutions
from a federal law suspending the state's
statute of limitations in federal court
cases.
The 11th Amendment protects states
from being sued by their citizens in
federal court.
The Raygor case is similar to Kimel et al.
V. Florida Board of Regents, a January
2000 case in which faculty from the
Florida State System sued their board
under the Federal Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967. The Supreme
Court ruled that states "may discriminate
on the basis of age without offending the
Fourteenth Amendment" if such
discrimination is "rationally related to a
legitimate state interest."
However, Howard Bolter, Raygor and
Goodchild's legal council, said the two
cases are different.
"Kimel is dealing with the federal age
discrimination statue itself, whereas this
case is dealing with more the procedural
issue that is, where does jurisdiction lie,"
Bolter said.
While Bolter believes that "the court has
been very pro-states' rights lately," he
remains optimistic about his clients'
chances.
"The court granted review because I don't
think they like state courts calling federal
law unconstitutional," Bolter said.
Mark Rotenburg, general counsel for the
University of Minnesota, agrees that the
case deals with the 11th Amendment,
claiming that it gives Minnesota the power
to set a statute of limitations for state
claims.
"[The 11th Amendment's] intention was
to protect our system of federal, limited
government," Rotenberg said.
Susan Bradshaw, associate vice president
for legal affairs at the University, said the
case is more about federalism and state
employees, rather than universities and
their staff.
"File your state law claim in state court,"
Bradshaw said.
Copyright * 2001 U-Wire
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Also This Term:
00-6567 Dusenbery v. United States
Ruling Below (6 Cir., 7/10/00):
In order to satisfy requirements of due process, government need not show that notice of
forfeiture action mailed to prison inmate whose property government seeks to forfeit
actually reached inmate, but need only show that it provided notice reasonably calculated to
apprise inmate of pendency of forfeiture action and to afford him opportunity to present his
objections.
Question Presented: Should this court grant certiorari to resolve split among circuits as to
whether prisoner must receive "actual notice" regarding forfeiture notification?
00-853 Porter v. Nussle
Ruling Below (2d Cir., 224 F.3d 95, 67 Crim. L. Rep. 743):
Civil rights action in which state prisoner alleges that prison guard assaulted or used
excessive force against him is not "action with respect to prison conditions" within meaning
of provision of Prison Litigation Reform Act that forbids such action to be brought under
federal law unless available administrative remedies have been exhausted, 42 U.S.C
51997e(a).
Question Presented: Did court of appeals err by concluding, contrary to other courts of
appeals, that inmate bringing claim for excessive force need not have exhausted available
administrative remedies pursuant to Prison Litigation Reform Act's mandatory exhaustion
requirement, 42 U.S.C §1997e(a)?
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